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MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA: "RETROACTIVE"
APPLICATION OF THE 1975 AMENDMENTS
Harry S. Laughran*
INTRODUCTION
Much attention has been devoted to the identification of certain sex-
based inequities in the community property systems of California' and
the seven other community property jurisdictions of the United States, 2
as well as to proposals for reform.' Impetus for these inquiries and
* Professor of Law, Loyola University of Los Angeles. The author expresses his
appreciation for the research assistance of Anthony J. LaBouff, Loyola Law School,
Class of 1975, and Catherine W. Laughran, Loyola Law School, Class of 1976.
1. See, e.g., Grant, How Much of a Partnership is Marriage?: Community Property
Rights Under the California Family Law Act of 1969, 23 HASTINGS LJ. 249 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Grant]; Comment, The Equal Rights Amendment and Inequality
Between Spouses Under the California Community Property System, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REv.
66 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Inequality Between Spouses]; Note, Equal Rights and
Equal Protection: Who Has Management and Control?, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 892 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Management and Control]; Comment, Management and Control of
Conununity Property: Sex Discrimination in California Law, 6 U.C.D.L. REv. 383
(1973).
2. See, e.g., Bingaman, The Effects of an Equal Rights Amendment on the New
Mexico System of Community Property: Problems of Characterization, Management and
Control, 3 N.M.L. REv. 11, (1973) [hereinafter cited as Bingaman: Equal Rights] (New
Mexico); Comment, Community Property: Male Management and Women's Rights,
1972 L. & Soc. ORDER 163 (Arizona); Comment, Management of the Louisiana
Community Property System: The Need for Reform, 48 TuL. L. REv. 591 (1974)
(Louisiana).
The seven community property states other than California are Arizona, Idaho,
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. The internal features of each
state's system may vary greatly. Indeed, the California system has been called sui
generis, H. VERRALL & A. SAMMIS, CALIFOn aA COMMUNrrY PROPERTY LAW 2 (2d ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as VERRALL & SAMMIs]; see Clark, Management and Control of
Community Property in New Mexico, 26 TuiL. L. REv. 324, n.1 (1952).
For a concise description of the key features of community property systems and the
other two basic marital property systems in use in Western societies today (separate
property systems derived from the common law, and "intermediate systems"), see
Bingaman: Equal Rights, supra, at 13-16. See also Glendon, Matrimonial Property: A
Comparative Study of Law and Social Change, 49 Tut. L. REv. 21 (1974). For a
detailed exposition and analysis of community property systems, see generally W.
DEFUNrAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY (2d ed. 1971) [herein-
after cited as DEFUNAK & VAUGHN].
3. See the articles cited in notes 1 & 2, supra, most of which contain specific proposals
for reform. For analyses of reforms already implemented in Texas, Washington, and
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proposals for reform has been prompted by the women's equality move-
ment, by possible ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, 4 and by
recent developments in equal protection litigation.5 Under the Equal
Rights Amendment, many, if not all, of the sex-based differentiations in
treatment of spouses under the community property laws doubtless
would be held void;6 arguably, the same result could follow under the
equal protection clause.'
In 1973 and 1974, the California legislature acted to eliminate many
of the sex-based inequities in the community property laws,8 apparently
New Mexico, see, e.g., Bingaman, The Community Property Act of 1973: A Commen-
tary and Quasi-Legislative History, 5 N.M.L. REv. 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Bingaman: Community Property]; Cross, Equality for Spouses in Washington Commu-
nity Property Law-1972 Statutory Changes, 48 WASH. L REv. 527 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Cross]; Huie, Divided Management of Community Property in Texas, 5 TEx.
TEcH. L. REV. 623 (1974); Comment, Section 5.22 of the Texas Family Code: Control
and Management of the Marital Estate, 27 Sw. L.J 837 (1973).
4. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
The Equal Rights Amendment provides, inter alia, that "[e]quality of rights under the
law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
sex." Id.
5. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5
Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971). For an analysis of Frontiero, Reed,
and Sail'er Inn, see Note, 48 TuL. L. Rnv. 710 (1974).
6. tl'f and when the Equal Rights Amendment becomes part of the United States
Constitution, it is clear, from its legislative history, that any state or federal distinc-
tion based upon sex, which is not inextricably linked to the biological characteristics
of men and women and which does not exist in all men and all women, would be
invalid.
Kanowitz, The New Mexico Equal Rights Amendment: Introduction and Overview, 3
N.M.L. R~v. 1, 8 (1973).
While Professor Kanowitz' statement may be over-broad, it seems clear that ratifica-
tion of the amendment at least would force states to demonstrate a "compelling state
interest" in order to avoid a declaration of unconstitutionality of sex-based differentia-
tions under the community property laws. See, Bingaman: Community Property, supra
note 3, at 38-39; Inequality Between Spouses, supra note 1, at 95; Management and
Control, supra note 1, at 908; Comment, Management of the Louisiana Community
Property System: The Need for Reform, 48 TuL. L. Ray. 591, at 594, n.26 (1974).
7. The California community property system has yet to be challenged on grounds of
denial of equal protection. Inequality Between Spouses, supra note 1, at 95, n.171.
For a forceful argument that certain pre-1975 features of the California system
were unconstitutional under not only the stringent "compelling state interest" test, but
also the more lenient "rational relationship" test, see Management and Control, supra
note 1, at 899-906. Recent statements of the California Supreme Court, respecting other
community property legislation, would seem to support this view. See In re Marriage
of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 588, 546 P.2d 1371, 1373, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 429 (1976).
8. Law of October 1, 1973, ch. 987, [1973] Cal. Stat. 1897; Law of Sept. 23, 1974, ch.
1206, [1974] Cal. Stat. 2609. The inequities referred to have been examined elsewhere
in detail. See, e.g., Inequality Between Spouses, supra note 1.
COMMUNITY.PROPERTY'
motivated, at least in part, by the prospect that, absent legislative
reform, the existing sections would have been declared unconstitution-
al9 The first section of this article focuses on these changes, which
took effect January 1, 1975, insofar as they relate to management and
control of community property in California.10 The next section states
briefly a doctrine which has blocked full and immediate implementation
of prior legislation increasing the rights and protections afforded the
wife with respect to community property. It goes on to examine
hypothetically the effect of the application of that doctrine to the 1975
amendments, and to note the doctrine's demise. Succeeding sections
trace the development and lingering death of the doctrine.
I. TiE 1975 MANAGEMENT 'AND CONTROL AMENDMENTS
Historically, in California, community property"' has been under the
management and control of the husband.' 2 . Since 1951, the wife has
Five other community property states--,Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico, Texas, and
Washington-thus far have acted in an attempt to eliminate such inequities. ARiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 25-214 (Supp. 1973); IDAHo CODE § 32-912 (Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 57-4A-8 (Supp. 1973); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (1975); WASH. Rxv. CODE
§ 26.16.030 (Supp. 1974).
9. See Comment, California's New Community Property Law-Its Effect on Inter-
spousal Mismanagement Litigation, 5 PAc. L.J. 723, 723-25 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Mismanagement Litigation].
10. The amendments already have been .examined in Bonanno, The Constitution
and "Liberated" Community Property in California-Some Constitutional Issues and
Problems Under the Newly Enacted Dymally Bill, 1 HAmNGS CONST. L.Q.
97 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Bonanno]; Kahn & Frimmer, Management, Probate and
Estate Planning Under California's New Community Property Laws, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 516
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Kahn & Frimmer]; Mismanagement Litigation, supra note
9; Reppy, Retroactivity of the 1975 California Community Property Reforms, 48 S.
CAL. L. RaV. 977 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Reppy]; Comment, Equal Management
and Control Under Senate Bill 569: "To Have and to Hold" Takes on New Meaning in
California, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 999 (1974) [hereinafter cited as "To Have and to
Hold"]. See also Review of Selected 1973 California Legislation; Domestic Relations,
Community Property, 5 PAc. L.J. 205, 352-58 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Review of
Selected 1973 Legislation].
11. Community property is defined in the California statutes by exclusion. Civil
Code section 5110 provides that "[e]xcept as provided in Sections 5107 [and] 5108 ....
all real property situated in this state and all personal property wherever situated
acquired during the marriage by a married person while domiciled in this state... is
community property .... " CAL. Civ. CoDE § .5110 (West Supp. 1975). Civil Code
sections 5107 and 5108 define separate property generally as all property of a married
person, owned by that person prior to marriage, or acquired during marriage by gift,
bequest, devise, or descent. Rents, issues, and profits of separate property are also
separate property. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 5107 & 5108 (West 1970).
12. Law of Sept. 6, 1969, ch. 1608; § 8; [1969] Cal. Stat. 3342, as amended Law of
Sept. 6, 1969, ch. 1609, § 24, [1969] Cal. Stat. 3358 (former CAL. Crv. CODE § 5125
1976]
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had the statutory right to management and control of her earnings,'" the
husband retaining that right as to all other community property. In
1973, effective January 1, 1975, the legislature repealed Civil Code
section 5124,14 under which the wife had management and control over
specified community property, and amended sections 5125's and
5127,1" under which the husband had management and control over all
other community personal and real property, respectively. As a result
of these changes, with one exception,' 7 neither spouse has exclusive
management -and control over any of the community property after
January 1, 1975-including his or her own salary. Section 5125 now
provides that "either spouse has the management and control of the
community personal property ... ."Is Section 5127, relating to man-
agement and control of community real property, contains the same
language.
19
These changes, which mean that married persons in California now
(West 1970)) [hereinafter cited as Former § 51251; Law of Sept. 6, 1969, ch. 1608, § 8,
[1969] Cal. Stat. 3342, ay amended Law of Sept. 6, 1969, ch. 1609, § 25, [19691 Cal.
Stat. 3358 (former CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127 (West 1970)) [hereinafter cited as Former §
5127]. These sections were in force until January 1, 1975.
13. Law of Sept. 6, 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, [19691 Cal. Stat. 3341, repealed, Law of Oct.
1, 1973, ch. 987, § 13, [1973] Cal. Stat. 1901 (former CAL. Crv. CODE § 5124 (West
1970)) [hereinafter cited as Former § 5124]. "Mhe wife has the management and
control of the community personal property earned by her. . . ." Id. The predecessor
of this section, section 171c, was added to the Civil Code by Law of June 18, 1951, ch.
1102, § 1, [1951] Cal. Stat. 2860, which provided that "the wife has the management
- . . [and] control . . . of community property money earned by her .
14. Law of Oct. 1, 1973, ch. 987, § 13, [1973] Cal. Stat. 1901.
15. Law of Oct. 1, 1973, ch. 987, § 14, [1973] Cal. Stat. 1901, amending CAL.
Civ. CODE § 5125 (West 1970) (now CAL. Civ. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1975)).
16. Law of Oct. 1, 1973, ch. 987, § 15, [1973] Cal. Stat. 1901, amending CAL. Civ.
CODE § 5127 (West 1970) (now CAL. CIrv. CODE § 5127 (West Supp. 1975)).
17. The exception, the "business management" exception (CAL. Civ. CODE § 5125(d)
(West Supp. 1975)) provides: "A spouse who is operating or managing a business or an
interest in a business which is community personal property has the sole management
and control of the business or interest."
Actually, the "exclusive" or "sole" management and control exercised by the wife over
her earnings (and personal injury damages) and by the husband over all other communi-
ty property was limited by both statutory restrictions to safeguard the interests of the
other spouse (see Former §§ 5125, 5127, supra note 12; Former § 5124, supra note 13)
and by a judicially imposed duty of "good faith." See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 14
Cal. App. 3d 560, 92 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1971). These restrictions have been continued in
the new legislation (CAL. CIV. CODn §§ 5125(b), (c) & 5127 (West Supp. 1975)), and,
for the first time, a statutory duty of "good faith" with respect to management and
control has been added. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5125(e) (West Supp. 1975).
18. CAL. CV. CODE § 5125(a) (West Supp. 1975).
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127 (West Supp. 1975).
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have equal20 rights to management and control of essentially all commu-
nity property, represent, at the minimum, a symbolic victory in the battle
for women's equality,"' and should be welcomed at least in principle.
20. The language "either spouse has the management and control" perhaps is not the
most felicitous which might have been chosen to effect a system whereby the spouses are
to have "equal" rights to management and control. "Equal" management and control
rights were, however, the apparent intent of the legislation. See Mismanagement
Litigation, supra note 9, at 724; Review of Selected 1973 Legislation, supra note 10, at
352.
The "equal rights" system selected by the legislature apparently is the same as the
"joint" management and control system proposed in Inequality Between Spouses, supra
note 1, at 91-92. Under this system, subject to certain safeguards, either spouse, acting
alone, or both, acting together, may fully bind, dispose of, and control the entire
community property. It is perhaps best termed a "joint and several" system. See
Bingaman: Community Property, supra note 3, at 40-41; Bingaman: Equal Rights, supra
note 2, at 44.
The new California "joint and several" system may be contrasted with a true system of
"joint" control, as described and criticized in Bingaman: Equal Rights, supra note 2, at
39-43, under which a joint decision and agreement on all investments, expenditures, and
other actions affecting community property would be required. It also differs from a
system of "modified joint control," which would provide for "joint and several" manage-
ment in terms of day-to-day expenditures, while requiring that the spouses agree with
respect to transactions in excess of a statutorily predetermined dollar amount, as
proposed in Management and Control, supra note 1, at 915-20, and discussed in
Bingaman: Equal Rights, supra note 2, at 47-54.
Both "joint" and "modified joint" management systems were considered, by the
California legislature and rejected. Mismanagement Litigation, supra note 9, at 725-26.
The "joint and several" system selected is not unlike the new systems in Arizona (Amz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-214 (Supp. 1973)), Idaho (IDnAo CODE § 32-912 (Supp. 1975)),
New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4A-8(a) (Supp. 1973)), and Washington (WASH.
REv. CoDE § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1974)). However, the New Mexico plan contains two
exceptions, which arguably represent improvements. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4A-
8(b), (c) (Supp. 1975); see Bingaman: Community Property, supra note 3, at 39-47.
All of these approaches to management and control reform differ from the Texas
approach which is sui generis, and might best be described as a "divided and joint"
management system. In Texas, each spouse has "sole management, control, and
disposition of the community property that he or she would have owned if single," but
commingled community property "is subject to the joint management, control, and
disposition of the spouses . . ." TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (1975). The Texas
approach is criticized in Bingaman: Equal Rights, supra note 2, at 39-43, 54-55, and
Management and Control, supra note 1, at 910-14.
21. The laws which designated the husband as manager of the community property
undoubtedly reflected cultural values and economic realities when enacted. The change is
termed "symbolic" because a change in the law from "male management" to "equal
management" will not of itself rid society of sexist stereotypes or alter the position of
women in the marketplace. That this is true is demonstrated by a comment made in
regard to the "equal management" amendments under discussion:
The legislature, by adopting a scheme of equal management and control .... has
avoided the requirement of getting the signatures of both husband and wife for all
transactions, which could have caused numerous problems in day-to-day transac-
tions, particularly spousal sales of community property. For example, many men
felt that requiring their wife's signature every time they wished to make a transac-
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The 1973 management and control legislation, while providing that it
was to be effective January 1, 1975, was silent as to whether it would
apply to all community property, including that acquired prior to its
effective date, or only to community property earned after its effective
date.
In 1974, in Senate Bill 1601, the legislature acted to amend sections
5125 and 5127, as previously amended by the 1973 legislation, again
effective January 1, 1975.2 The sections now provide that " . . .
either spouse has the management and control of the community . . .
[personal and real, respectively] property, whether acquired prior to or
on or after January 1, 1975. -23 Thus, the legislature has stated its
intention that the management and control amendments shall apply to
all community property held on or after the effective date of sections
5125 and 5127, regardless of when such property may have been
acquired. For the first time, the legislature has forced the courts to
make a choice between specific legislative intent and the court-made
Doctrine of Prospective Application (DPA).2 4
tion in the stock market would be extremely burdensome. Also they were fearful
that the consent might be withheld for petty reasons. The ["business management
exception" (CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125(d))] also should silence many of these critics.
Without this provision it was felt that a spouse who knew nothing about the opera-
tion of a particular business could insist on exercising her right to equal manage-
ment and control.
Review of Selected 1973 Legislation, supra note 10, at 357.
I have previously noted, in another context, that "law reflects cultural values," and,
"indeed, often lags behind, so -that, at a given moment and in a given context, law may
reflect outmoded values," but that "[l]aw may, of course, take the lead in some
situations, so that legal changes are precursors of value changes." Laughran, The Law
and the Corporate Polluter: Flexibility and Adaption in the Developing Law of the
Environment, 23 MERcER L. REV. 571, 574 (1972). Perhaps the community property
amendments under discussion truly reflect altered societal values; to the extent they do
not, they may prove to be precursors of an altered cultural consciousness. In the
California Constitutional Convention over a century ago one delegate said: "Sir, the God
of nature made woman frail, lovely, and dependent. . . ." I. BROWNE, DEBATES IN THE
CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA 259 (1850), quoted in VERRALL & SAMMIS, supra note 2, at
227 n.l. While, to paraphrase a well-known commercial message, "we've come a long
way" since then, it truthfully may be said that "we've got a long way to go."
22. Law of Sept. 23, 1974, ch. 1206, H9 4 & 5 [1974] Cal. Stat. 2609, amending CAL.
Civ. CODE H9 5125 & 5127 (West 1970) (now CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125 & 5127 (West
Supp. 1975)).
23. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 5125 (personal property) & 5127 (real property) (West Supp.
1975).
24. Armstrong, "Prospective" Application of Changes in Community Property Con.
trol-Rule of Property or Constitutional Necessity?, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 476, 481, 503-04
(1945) [hereinafter cited as Armstrong]. Professor Armstrong refers to the DPA as
the "prospective application" rule. Id. at 477. It has also been termed The Doctrine
Against Retroactive Application of Amendments. VERIALL & SAMMIS, supra note 2, at
37.
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II. THE DOCTRINE OF PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION AND ITS
HYPOTHETICAL EFFECT ON THE 1975 AMENDMENTS
The DPA is based on the less than universally accepted idea that the
right to management and control of community property is itself a
property right, and that to decrease one spouse's right to management
and control amounts to an unconstitutional impairment of a vested
property right of the other spouse without due process. 25 Briefly stated,
the DPA, which dates back to Spreckels v. Spreckels,26 holds that an
amendment to the community -property law which would affect the
rights of one of the spouses (historically, the husband) to manage-
ment and control, can apply neither to* community property acquired
prior to the effective date of the amendment,2 7 nor to property acquired
after that date, if such property is acquired in exchange for, or repre-
sents rents, issues, or profits of, property acquired prior to that date.28
The effect of the DPA has been that
the marital property rule which applies at any one time to identical
types of property -[e.g., earnings] in the hands of existing married
couples is not one invariable rule, but one of a series of rules; which
one of the series depends upon when the property or the corpus from
which it originally derived, came into the hands of the spouses.
29
To illustrate, assume the existence of a hypothetical couple, Harold
and Wanda Smith, residents of California, who were married in 1970.
Harold is employed in industry. Wanda was employed in business from
1970 to 1973; using savings from her earnings, she opened a small
business. The two spouses keep separate bank accounts, and after
January 1, 1975, each keeps money traceable to his or her pre-1975
activities segregated from money earned after that date30 If the DPA
were to be applied to the "equal rights" management and control
25. See, e.g., Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 619-20, 145 P.2d 312, 315-16 (1944);
McKay v. Lauriston, 204 Cal. 557, 566, 269 P. 519, 523 (1928); Roberts v. Wehmeyer,
191 Cal. 601, 218 P. 22 (1923); Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 348-49, 48 P.
228, 231 (1897); Paley v. Bank of America, 159 Cal. App. 2d 500, 506-07, 324 P.2d 35,
40 (1958).
26. 116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228 (1897).
27. E.g., id.; McKay v. Lauriston, 204 Cal. 557, 567, 269 P. 519, 522-23 (1928).
28. ee, e.g., Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 145 P.2d 312 (1944).
29. Armstrong, supra note 24, at 477.
30. Segregation of the wife's earnings was necessary under Former § 5124, supra note
13, since she retained management and control only until such earnings were "commin-
gled with community property subject to the management and control of the husband
.... " Id. Segregation of pre-1975 assets would be necessary after January 1, 1975 for
both husband and wife, since the pre-1975 law would apply only to those assets, the
acquisition of which could be traced to the earlier date.
1976]
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amendments under discussion, so that "new" sections 5125 and 5127
could apply prospectively only, the Smiths' situation would be as fol-
lows. 31
Harold would have management and control over his pre-1975 earn-
ings; over any income, such as interest, derived from those earnings,
whether before or after January 1, 1975; and over any investments, in
real or personal property, made with that money, whether before or after
January 1, 1975. Harold and Wanda would have "equal" rights to
management and control over his post-January 1, 1975 earnings, and
over investments made therewith.
Wanda would have management and control over her pre-1975 earn-
ings, 2 and, even after January 1, 1975, would retain management and
control over the business, 33 sharing "equal" rights to management and
control of profits from the business with Harold after January 1, 1975.
However, such equal management and control would exist only to the
extent that profits earned after that date are withdrawn by her as salary
or its equivalent. 4
31. For illustrations of the effect of the DPA on married couples with respect to
earlier changes in the community property laws see Armstrong, supra note 24, at 477-81.
32. Under former section 5124 the wife had management and control over "communi-
ty personal property earned by her... until it is commingled with community property
subject to the management and control of the husband . . . ." Former § 5124, supra
note 13. Under former section 5127, the husband had "management and control of the
community real property. . . ." Former § 5127, supra note 12 (emphasis added). By
necessary implication, the wife lost all rights to management and control the moment she
invested her earnings in real property. See Comment, Management and Control of
Community Property: Sex Discrimination in California Law, 6 U.C.D.L. REv. 383, 383-
84 (1973). However, the husband had no legal right to interfere with the wife's
management and control of her own earnings, and thus could not object if she chose to
invest in real property. Moreover, as to acquisitions of real property prior to January 1,
1975, where the wife took title in her own name, the property is presumed to be her
separate property. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1975). As to this discussion
generally, and the effect of the presumption see In re Marriage of Mix, 14 Cal. 3d 604,
610-11, 536 P.2d 479, 482-84, 122 Cal. Rptr. 79, 82-84 (1975).
33. This is provided by the "business management" exception. CAL. CIV. CODE §
5125(d); see note 17, supra.
34. But see "To Have and to Hold," supra note 10.
The consequences of one spouse asserting sole control over a community personal
property business may not be as drastic as it might seem; that is, the sole control
will be limited to managing the business or interest therein, and not to control over
the profits or earnings therefrom.
Id. at 1004. This statement seems ill-considered. Surely one of the primary functions
of the manager of a business is the basic business decision of whether to reinvest profits.
It would seem, therefore, that one spouse's right to "equal" management and control of
community property generally would extend to earnings of a community property
business under the management of the other spouse only to the extent that those earnings
are "withdrawn" from the business. Such business decisions would be subject to the
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
If, in 1979, Harold wished to purchase an apartment building, using
his segregated pre-1975 earnings as a down-payment, Wanda would
have no right to object. Likewise, if, in 1983, Harold decided to sell the
apartment building, Wanda would have no right to object.35 If, in
1985, Wanda wished to sell the business and invest in utility stock,
Harold arguably would have no right to object.3 6
Were the DPA to be applied to the 1975 management and control
amendments, the resolution of marital property disputes involving man-
agement and control issues would continue to hinge on the application
of "one of a series of rules."37 If the proponent of the application of a
rule no longer generally in force at the time of the dispute could succeed
in the "often. . . tortuous process"38 of tracing the acquisition of the
property in question, or "the corpus from which it originally derived,"39
to an earlier date, the rule in force on the earlier date would apply.
That result would continue a situation with which California judges,
lawyers, and married persons have had to contend since the Spreckels
decision in 1897.40 Another consequence would be that since the qld
law(s) 41 would continue to apply to assets of married Californians
traceable to the pre-1975 period, application of the old laws still would
be open to challenge on equal protection grounds, and almost certainly
would be declared invalid in event of ratification of the Equal Rights
Amendment.42  As a result, substantial uncertainty would continue,
statutory interspousal "good faith" requirement. CAL. Clv. CODE § 5125(e) (West Supp.
1975).
35. It would, however, be necessary for her to join with him -in executing the deed.
CAL. Crv. CODE § 5127 (West Supp. 1975). Presumably, he could force joinder in a
proper case, since her refusal to join could be viewed as an unreasonable restraint on his
legitimate rights to management and control, and, if a sale were prevented, would amount -
to a deprivation of those rights. Cf. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 21 Cal. App. 3d 457, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 319 (1971).
36. This assumes that -the wife's statutory right to management and control of her
uncommingled pre-1975 earnings extended to control over personal property investments
made with those earnings. If it did not, the "right" to management and control would
have been empty indeed. To the effect that it did, see In re Marriage of Mix, 14 Cal. 3d
604, 536 P.2d 479, 122 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1975).
37. Armstrong, supra note 24, at 477.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228 (1897).
41. For example, acquisitions traceable to pre-1951 earnings of a married woman
would continue to be under the management and control of her husband. See notes 11-
13 supra and accompanying text.
42. See notes 4-7 supra and accompanying text. But see Bonanno, supra note 10, at
120-27 (arguments for the proposition that the Equal Rights Amendment would not
dictate "retroactive" application of "equal" management and control provisions).
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particularly in the area of creditors' rights. 4 Happily, the recent deci-
sion of the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Bouquet
44
indicates almost conclusively that the amendments will be applied "ret-
roactively,"4 n and that the DPA is dead. The following section traces
the history of the Doctrine.
Ill. THE DOCTRINE OF PROSPECTVE APPLICATION
A. Development and Criticism
The soundness of the DPA has been questioned since its inception."
An attack on the old laws based on denial of equal protection or violation of the Equal
Rights Amendment due to sex-based discrimination could be mounted by either spouse in
a proper case. For example, although most commentators have focused on discrimina-
tion against the wife under the general management and control provisions of former
sections 5125 and 5127 (Former §§ 5125 & 5127 supra note 12), it must be recalled that
under former section 5124 (Former § 5124 supra note 13), the wife had sole manage-
ment and control of certain items of community property, notably her uncommingled
earnings. Access to such property could be important to a husband in a given case. See,
e.g., In re Marriage of Mix, 14 Cal. 3d 604, 536 P.2d 479, 122 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1975)
(wife was attorney); Garfein v. Garfein, 16 Cal. App. 3d 155, 93 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1971)
(wife was movie star).
43. The uncertainty mentioned in the text would ensue because creditors' rights of
access to community property generally have followed management and control. Thus,
under the pre-1975 law, the earnings of the wife generally were not liable for debts of
the husband contracted during marriage (Law of Sept. 4, 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, [1969] Cal.
Stat. 3340 (former CAL. CIrv. CODE § 5117) (repealed 1974)), but were liable for her
own debts. Law of Sept. 4, 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, [1969] Cal. Stat. 3340 (former CAL. Civ.
CODE § 5116). Other community property generally was not liable for debts of the wife,
contracted during marriage, but was liable for debts of the husband. Id.
Both the 1973 and 1974 amendments made extensive changes in the law relating to
creditors' rights of access -to community property. "New" section 5116 provides that:
'"The property of the community is liable for the contracts of either spouse which are
made after marriage and prior to or on or after January 1, 1975." CAL. Civ. CODE §
5116 (West Supp. 1975). A holding of "non-retroactivity" of the recent amendments
would mean that a husband's segregated, traceable pre-1975 earnings would, as a general
rule, continue unavailable to satisfy debts contracted by the wife.
A thorough discussion of the recent amendments is beyond the scope of this article.
For an analysis of these changes with respect to creditors' rights, and their constitutional
ramifications see Bonnanno, supra note 10; Reppy, supra note 10.
44. 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976).
45. In the present context, there are two possible meanings of the word "retroactive."
In the narrow or technical sense, the legislation will be applied "retroactively," in that
it will apply to property acquired prior to its effective date. A broad definition of the
term would imply that the legislation purported to affect transactions entered into prior
to its effective date, which it does not. Law of Sept. 23, 1974, ch. 1206, § 7, [1974] Cal.
Stats. 2609 provides: This act shall not apply to or affect any act or transaction which
occurred prior to January 1, 1975."
46. The DPA has been roundly criticized by the bench and, most notably, in the
scholarly journals, since its inception. See, e.g., Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 623, 145
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
In 1944, in Boyd v. Oser,47 the California Supreme Court held that a
1923 statute which granted to the wife rights of testamentary disposition
over one half the community property48 constitutionally could not apply
to property which, although acquired after 1923, represented rents,
issues, or profits of property acquired prior to that date. To permit
such application would allow the wife, -through exercise of testamentary
disposition, to deprive the husband of the right to manage and control
such property.4 9 Justice Traynor, concurring in the result, wrote:
The decisions that existing statutes changing the rights of husbands
and wives in community property can have no retroactive application
have become a rule of property in this state and should not now be
overruled. It is my opinion, however, that the constitutional theory on
which they are based is unsound .... That theory has not become a
rule of property and should not invalidate future legislation in this field
intended by the Legislature to operate retroactively. 0
Justice Traynor relied on two United States Supreme Court cases,
Warburton v. Whiter1 and Arnett v. Reade,52 as well as a law review
comment,"3 as authority for his proposition that the constitutional un-
derpinning of the DPA was unsound.
P.2d 312, 318 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339,
350-51, 48 P. 228, 231-32 (1897) (Beatty, J., concurring); Armstrong, supra note 24;
Knutson, California Community Property Laws: A Plea for Legislative Study and
Reform, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 240 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Knutson]; Comment,
Community and Separate Property: Constitutionality of Legislation Decreasing Hus-
band's Power of Control over Property Already Acquired, 27 CALIr. L. Rv. 49 (1938)
[hereinafter cited as Community and Separate Property]; cf., Bodenheimer, Justice
Peters' Contribution to Family and Community Property Law, 57 CALWF. L. REV. 577,
577-88 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer].
47. 23 Cal. 2d 613, 145 P.2d 312 (1944).
48. Now codified as CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 201 (West 1956).
49. The court had previously held, in McKay v. Lauriston, 204 Cal. 557, 269 P. 519
(1928), that the same statute constitutionally could not apply to community property
acquired prior to its effective date.
50. 23 Cal. 2d 613, 623, 145 P.2d 312, 318 (Traynor, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
The original reasons for adopting a rule are of course immaterial when by long
usage and continued judicial sanction, it has become a rule of property. The rule
of property receives legal respect by virtue of a species of public estoppel, i.e. be-
cause of long established dealings in reliance upon it. Under no circumstances,
however, does the legal respect which is held to be due to the rule of property carry
over to the reasons for, its adoption in the first place. Indeed, it is because the
foundation for the rule in question has slipped away (or never really had been
there) that it needs to be recognized as a rule of property.
Armstrong, supra note 24, at 504-05.
51. 176 U.S. 484 (1900).
52. 220 U.S. 311 (1911).
53. Community and Separate Property, supra note 46. In regard to that Comment,
Professor Armstrong's landmark 1945 article, written after the decision in Boyd, repre-
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In Warburton v. White, the Supreme Court considered the effective-
ness of a Washington statute, passed in 1879, which gave each spouse
rights of testamentary disposition as to one half of the community
property, such one half passing to decedent's issue in case of intestacy.
The statute was applied to property acquired in 1877, at which time
neither spouse had testamentary power over community property (it
passing to the survivor on the death of either). The husband, both at
the time of purchase of the property in controversy and the time of
passage of the new succession statute, had sole powers of management
and control over community property. The Court held, after an analy-
sis of the Washington community property law, that when one of the
spouses died the marital community came to an end, and disposition of
the decedent's interest was a matter of succession.5 4
In Arnett v. Reade, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Holmes, held that a 1901 New Mexico statute which prohibited the
conveyance, mortgaging, or encumbrancing of community real property
without joinder of both spouses could be applied to land acquired as
community property prior to 1901, even though at the time of the
acquisition the wife's joinder would not have been necessary.
In Spreckels v. Spreckels,"5 the case which "gave birth" to the DPA,
sents, in her words, an "amplification of [the] argument" made therein. Armstrong,
supra note 24, at 476 n.1.
54. The Court's treatment of the problem presented in Warburton as merely a matter
of succession is similar to the analysis of the California Supreme Court in In re Estate of
Phillips, 203 Cal. 106, 263 P. 1017 (1928), in dealing with a different feature of the
1923 amendments to former Civil Code section 1401 (now CAL. PROB. CoD- ANN. § 201
(West 1956)) than that considered in Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 145 P.2d 312
(1944) and, McKay v. Lauriston, 204 Cal. 557, 269 P. 519 (1928).
Prior to the amendments, upon the death of the wife, the community property
belonged to the husband entirely; upon the death of the husband, one half of such
property went to the wife, the other half, absent testamentary disposition, went to his
descendants. After the amendments, upon the death of either spouse, one half of the
community property went to the surviving spouse, the other one half was subject to
testamentary disposition by the decedent; in the absence of testamentary disposition, that
one half passed to the surviving spouse. See CAL. PROB. CoDn ANN. § 201 (West 1956).
In McKay, the court held that the extension of testamentary disposition to the wife could
not apply to community property acquired prior to the effective date of the amendment.
In Phillips, the court held that the amendment,
in so far as it provides that the wife in case of the death of her husband intestate
shall inherit the half of the community property which was subject to his testa-
mentary disposition, is a statute of descent and succession, or a rule of inheritance.
m. . Mhe law of inheritance in force and effect at the date of acquisition of the
property does not determine the right to inherit it upon the death of the owner
.. . the law in force at the date of. . . death of the owner of the property deter-
mines who shall inherit it ....
203 Cal. 106, 109-10, 263 P. 1017, 1019 (1928).
55. 116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228 (1897).
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the California Supreme Court considered an amendment to then-section
172 (present section 5125) of the Civil Code. 56 Prior to the amend-
ment, section 172 provided that "[tihe husband has the management
and control of community property, with the like power of disposition
(other than testamentary) as he has of his separate estate."5 7  The
amendment added the following restriction: "Provided, however, that he
cannot make a gift of such community property, or convey the same
without a valuable consideration, unless the wife, in writing, consent
thereto. ' 58
The Spreckels court held that the requirement that the wife consent to
gifts of community property by the husband could not apply to property
acquired prior to the effective date of the amendment. The court
concluded that, prior to the 1891 amendment, "the code vested in the
husband, with reference to the community property, all the elements of
ownership, and in the wife none,"5 9 and went on to say that "[als the
law stood prior to the amendment . . . [no] happier phrase could have
been devised to express the interest of the wife in the community
property than . . . 'a mere expectancy.' "60 Counsel for the wife
admitted that "if the husband is the owner of the property, then a statute
which makes the exercise of the right to dispose of it subject to the will
of another is uncongtitutional. ' ' 61 Thus, the basic constitutional founda-
tion of the DPA, that application of amendments altering rights to
management and control of previously acquired community property
represents an unconstitutional deprivation of vested property rights,
never was argued in the Spreckels case, but was adopted by the court on
the basis of a concession of counsel. 62
The United States Supreme Court, having based its decision in War-
burton v. White63 on the theory that disposition of a decedent's estate
was a matter of succession, the marital community of property having
56. Law of March 31, 1891, ch. 220, § 1, [1891] Cal. Stat. 425, as amended CAL.
CIV. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1975).
57. Former CAL. Civ. CODE § 172 (1872), as quoted in 116 Cal. at 341, 48 P. at 228.
58. Law of March 31, 1891, ch. 220, § 1, [1891] Cal. Stat. 425, as amended CAL.
CIV. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1975) (emphasis deleted).
59. 116 Cal. at 342, 48 P. at 229.
60. Id. at 347, 48 P. at 231 (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 349, 48 P. at 231.
62. Professor Armstrong pointed out not only that the constitutional doctrine grew out
of the concession of counsel in Sp'reckels, but also that its doctrinal vitality continued to
be conceded by counsel in such later cases as McKay v. Lauriston, 204 Cal. 557, 269 P.
519 (1928), and Roberts v. Wehmeyer, 191 Cal. 601, 218 P. 22 (1923). See Arm-
strong, supra note 24, at 497-501.
63. 176 U.S. 484 (1900).
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ended on the death of the wife,"4 refused to consider Spreckels and
instead distinguished it on the ground that it involved a question of inter
vivos control during the existence of the community.05 Although in
Warburton the wife had died intestate, the same result presumably
would have been reached had she purported to leave the property by
will. In either case the wife's death would result in community property
passing from the husband's control; the distinction between Warburton
and Spreckels thus may be viewed as spurious, since Spreckels was based
on the idea that the husband owned the community property.
It is clear that legislation granting testamentary disposition over part
of the community property to the wife, if applicable to property pre-
viously acquired and over which the husband retained during his life-
time sole rights to management and control, could be construed as
depriving him of those rights in a case where the wife predeceases him,
just as to subject his rights "to the will of another" was held to represent
a deprivation in Spreckels. That, in fact, was the exact construction
accorded the 1923 amendments to present Probate Code section 201 in
McKay v. Lauriston"6 and Boyd v. Oser.17  Thus, despite the Supreme
Court's attempt to distinguish Spreckels, Warburton may be read as
inconsistent,6" and certainly is inconsistent with McKay and Boyd.
In Arnett v. Reade, the Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of
whether or not the wife in New Mexico had a vested interest in the
community property. Whatever the exact nature of her interest, it was
held to be at least "a greater interest than the mere possibility of an
expectant heir," 9 and, even prior to the statutory amendment under
consideration, she was said to have had "a remedy for an alienation
64. See text accompanying note 54, supra.
65. 176 U.S. 484, 497 (1900).
66. 204 Cal. 557, 269 P. 519 (1928).
67. 23 Cal. 2d 613, 145 P.2d 312 (1944).
68. Such a reading is bolstered by the Court's statements in Warburton that the
control powers vested in the husband were granted him purely in the capacity of agent or
trustee for the marital community. 176 U.S. at 490, 494, 497. This indicates the
Court's view that the rules relating to "inter vivos control were not frozen to those in
existence at the acquisition of community property." Armstrong, supra note 24, at 492
n.41. See also Holyoke v. Jackson, 3 P. 841, 842 (Wash. 1882) (the husband's
management power is "a mere power conferred upon him as member and head of the
community in trust for the community, and not a proprietary right . . ."). This
continues to be the view in Washington. See Cross, supra note 3, at 551-53.
69. 220 U.S. 311, 320 (1911). Compare this statement of the Court quoted in the
text with the California court's statement in Spreckels: "[No] happier phrase could have
been devised to express the interest of the wife in the community than . . . 'a mere
expectancy."' 116 Cal. at 347, 48 P. at 231 (citation omitted).
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made in fraud of her by her husband." 7°  Since "she was protected
against fraud already," Justice Holmes concluded, "we can conceive no
reason why the legislature could not make that protection more effectual
by requiring her concurrence in her husband's deed of the land."71
Since it was argued in Arnett that the husband had absolute and
vested property rights in the community property, and that the wife had
a mere expectancy, so that to permit the statute to apply to the property
in question would represent a deprivation of the husband's vested rights,
that case represents an implicit repudiation of the Spreckels doctrine, in
that it indicates "that the question of whether the marital property right
[of husband or wife] . . . is or is not vested is not the controlling . . .
question ... 72 The holding in Arnett directly conflicts with Roberts
v. Wehmeyer,73 which held that Civil Code section 172a, enacted in
1917'7 could not apply to previously acquired community real proper-
ty. That section, the equivalent of the New Mexico statute at issue in
Arnett, required the wife's joinder with the husband in executing any
instrument by which community real property was conveyed, encum-
bered, or leased for more than a year.
75
As Professor Armstrong pointed out in 1945, the opinion in Arnett
70. 220 U.S. at 320.
71. Id. It is noteworthy that the California Supreme Court, in Stewart V. Stewart, 199
Cal. 318, 249 P. 197 (1926), made statements fully in accord with the language from
Arnett quoted in the text, and indicated that such always had been the law in California:
Mhe interest of the wife in the property of the community.. while it has not
yet reached the status of a vested interest therein, is and has always been . . . a
much more definite and present interest than is that of an ordinary heir. She has
r . . ights therein which have been always safeguarded against the fraudulent or
inconsiderate acts of her husband with relation thereto and for the assertion and
safeguarding of which he has been given access to appropriate judicial remedies
199 Cal. at 342-43, 249 P. at 207.
In 1927, section 161a of the Civil Code was enacted by Law of April 28, 1927, ch. 265,
§ 1, [1927] Cal. Stat. 484, as amended CAL. CIrv. CODE § 5105 (West Supp. 1975)
which provided that:
The respective interests of the husband and wife in community property during
continuance of the marriage relation are present, existing and equal interests under
the management and control of the husband. . . . This section shall be construed
as defining the respective interests and rights of husband and wife in the community
property.
This section survives as Civil Code section 5105, but was amended in 1973, effective
January 1, 1975, to delete the reference to management and control by the husband. Law
of October 1, 1973, ch. 987, § 4, [1973] Cal. Stat. 1898, amending CAL. Civ. CODE §
5105 (West 1970).
72. Armstrong, supra note 24, at 495.
73. 191 Cal. 601, 218 P. 22 (1923).
74. Law of May 23, 1917, ch. 583, § 2, [1917] Cal. Stat. 829 (now CAL. CIV. CODE §
5127 (West Supp. 1975)).
75. Armstrong, supra note 24, at 494.
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"strongly suggests that a challenge of [the California Supreme Court's]
constitutional theory would have been sympathetically received by the
United States Supreme Court"76 at least as early as 1911. Indeed, the
California Supreme Court, in its first opinion in In re Estate of Thorn-
ton77 (Thornton I), appeared to recognize the unsoundness of the
constitutional dogma of Spreckels and its progeny, and, even in the
second In re Estate of Thornton78 (Thornton H1) opinion, arguably
recognized that the DPA really represented only a "rule of property."
B. The Doctrine of Prospective Application and Reclassification Leg-
islation: Estate of Thornton and Probate Code Section 201.5
The Thornton controversy involved 1917 and 1923 amendments to
then-section 164 (present section 5110) of the Civil Code,70 which
represented the first attempts to legislate with respect to what is now
termed "quasi-community property."'
In 1917, the legislature amended section 164 so as to define as
community property any property within California's jurisdiction (i.e.,
California realty and personal property wherever situated) acquired by
married persons while domiciled elsewhere, which would have been
community property had the parties been domiciled in California at the
time of acquisition.81 In other words, what would have been the
separate property of the acquiring spouse in the state of domicile at the
time of acquisition was reclassified as community property upon estab-
lishment of the marital domicile in California. This legislation afforded
the protection of California community property law to married persons
who, upon establishing domicile in California, lost the protection of the
marital property laws of the former domicile, and who, absent the
legislation, would have had no protection in California.
8 2
76. 19 P.2d 778 (Cal. 1933), vacated, 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934).
77. 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934).
78. Law of May 23, 1917, ch. 581, § 1, [1917] Cal. Stat. 827 (now CAL. CIV. CoDE §
5110 (West Supp. 1975)).
79. Law of June 14, 1923, ch. 360, § 1, [1923] Cal. Stat. 746 (now CAL. CIV. CODE §
5110 (West Supp. 1975)).
80. CAL. CiV. CODE § 4803 (West 1970); see CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 201.5 (West
1956). A full discussion of qJuasi-community property is beyond the scope of this article.
For an exhaustive treatment, see Schreter, "Quasi-Community Property" in the Conflict
of Laws, 50 CALIF. L. Rnv. 206 (1962).
81. Law of May 23, 1917, ch. 581, § 1, [1917] Cal. Stat. 827 (now CAL. Civ. CoDn §
5110 (West Supp. 1975) ).
82. Thus, while on dissolution of a marriage, each spouse is awarded one half of the
community assets (CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West 1970)), neither spouse is awarded any
of the separate property of the other. On death of a married person, the surviving
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The 1917 legislation was held inapplicable to property brought to
California prior to its passage in Estate of Frees.8 In 1923,14 the
legislature "supplemented and clarified the amendment by the use of
appropriate words to make its provisions apply . . . [to the defined
class of property] whether brought into the state before or after passage
of the act."88  In Estate of Drishaus,86 it was again held that the
legislation could not apply to property reaching a California domicile
prior to its passage.
In Thornton, domicile was established in California in 1919, the
property involved having been acquired as the husband's separate prop-
erty under Montana law between 1885 and 1919. In 1929, he died
testate, still domiciled in California, attempting by his will to dispose of
all said property as his separate property to someone other than his wife.
Mrs. Thornton petitioned for distribution of one half of the property
under Probate Code section 201, alleging that it was community proper-
ty under Civil Code section 164, as amended in 1917.
In Thornton I, the supreme court, holding amended section 164
effective to give the surviving spouse a community property interest
under Probate Code section 201, stated:
[E]ven if . . . [section 164] does constitute a deprivation of a
property right in the constitutional sense . . . such legislation is permis-
sible under the power of the Legislature to control and regulate the
marriage relation and its incidental property rights.
87
This seems to represent a clear recognition by the supreme court "that
the question of whether . . . [a] marital property right . . . is or is not
vested is not the controlling . . . question in constitutional review,"8
spouse takes one half of the community property of right, the other one half being
subject to the testamentary disposition of the decedent. CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 201
(West 1956). As to separate property, however, the surviving spouse shares only in
event of the decedent's intestacy. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 221 (West 1956).
Civil Code section 4803 and Probate Code section 201.5 are designed to remedy this
situation as to property which would have been community property had the parties been
domiciled in California at the time of its acquisition. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4803 (West
1970); CAL. PROB. CODEANN. § 201.5 (West 1956).
83. 187 Cal. 150, 201 P. 112 (1921).
84. Law of May 23, 1917, ch. 581, § 1, [19171 Cal. Stat. 827 (now CAL. CIV. CODE §
5110 (West Supp. 1975)).
85. In re Estate of Thornton, 1 Cal. 2d 1, 4, 33 P.2d 1, 2 ('1934).
86. 199 Cal. 369, 249 P. 515 (1926).
87. 19 P.2d 778, 784 (Cal. 1933), vacated, 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934) (emphasis
added).
88. Armstrong, supra note 24, at 495.
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and that vested rights may, in proper circumstances, be impaired with
due process of law. 9 In Professor Armstrong's words:
The constitutional question, on principle,. . . would seem to be, not
whether a vested right is impaired by a marital property law change, but
whether such a change reasonably could be believed to be sufficiently
necessary to the public welfare as to justify the impairment.
The stability of the marital unit, while of course not dependent
exclusively upon marital property rules, is not uninfluenced by them.
So complete is the concern of the state in the preservation of its basic
institution,. . . that there would seem to be no field of regulation that
would be more obviously within the limits of legislative action than that
of the marital institution and its incidents. 90
On rehearing in 1934 the court reversed its ruling in Thornton I and
held, in Thornton 11,11 that the amendments to section 164 were uncon-
stitutional. Professor Armstrong asserts that it is implicit in the deci-
sion in Thornton II that the court really was continuing to recognize the
DPA merely as a "rule of property,""2 and that the court reversed itself
not because "i[t] had ceased to believe in the constitutional theory"9"
expounded in Thornton 1,11 but
because section 164 accorded less protection in his marital property
rights to the husband who accumulated his property elsewhere than
. . . under Spreckels and its progeny, we accorded to the husband
who acquired. . . property here.95
In other words, since, under Spreckels, property rights of married
persons who acquired property while domiciled in California were gov-
erned by the law in effect on the date of acquisition and could not be
affected by subsequent statutory changes, the court felt it could not
89. Id.
90. Id. at 496. It seems clear that there should be "no substantial constitutional
objection," on due process grounds, "to effective revision by the legislature of the
methods it employs to protect its legitimate interest in the marital relationship, including
the property rights incident thereto." Knutson, supra note 46, at 267. See Addison v.
Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 566, 399 P.2d 897, 902, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102 (1965).
91. 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934).
92. Armstrong, supra note 24, at 501.
93. Id. at 502.
94. See text accompanying note 87, supra.
95. Armstrong, supra note 24, at 502. It should be noted that, while the Thornton
facts happened to involve the husband's property, section 164 applied equally to both
husbands and wives. The Spreckels line of cases all happened to involve legislation
which increased the rights of wives while limiting those of husbands; however, the due
process dogma would have been applicable equally had the facts been reversed.
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uphold legislation which purported to alter property rights of married
persons when the property had been acquired while domiciled in anoth-
er state and the rights of the parties with respect to such property
previously had been determined under the laws of the other state.96
As authority for this point, Professor Armstrong quotes the following
language from the opinion:
"So long as we are bound by the holding that to limit the rights of
one spouse by increasing the right of the other in property acquired, by
their united labors, is the disturbance of a vested right, we entertain no
doubt of the application of at least two provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. If the right of a
husband, a citizen of California, as to his separate property, is a vested
one and may not be impaired or taken by California law, then to
disturb in the same manner the same property right of a citizen of
another state, who chances to transfer his domicile to this state,
bringing his property with him, is clearly to abridge the privileges and
immunities of the citizen."
97
The italicized language in the quotation apparently represents the
basis for Professor Armstrong's assertions that the court in Thornton II
viewed the DPA as merely a "rule of property,"9" to which it was bound
96. This of course ignores proper state-interest analysis as well as the basic question.
To assume that marital property rights were "vested" under the laws of the domicile at
the time of acquisition and cannot be altered in any way upon establishing domicile in
California is just as faulty as the assumption of Spreckels, that rights with respect to
community property are "vested" and thus cannot be altered by subsequent legislation.
"[B]y characterizing the right as 'vested,' the court simply assumed the conclusion: 'a
right is vested when it has been so far perfected that it cannot be taken away by
statute."' Knutson, supra note 46, at 267, quoting Hochman, The Supreme Court and
the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Htnv. L. Rav. 692, 696 (1960).
Moreover, with respect to the Thornton controversy, the court, in insisting that the
property earned by the husband in Montana had to remain his separate property in
California, actually altered property rights and expectations substantially, since the wife
would have had dower rights with respect to the property under Montana law, whereas
those rights were lost upon the change of domicile to California and the attendant
classification of the property as "separate" under California law. Bodenheimer, supra
note 46, at 579-80; see Knutson, supra note 46, at 269 n.223. See also notes 81 & 82
supra and accompanying text.
If the court in Thornton 11 truly felt the DPA to be merely a "rule of property," it
might have upheld the legislation in question, since the legislature had acted specifically
to provide for "retroactivity," and invited the legislature so to provide with regard to
changes affecting management and control of community property.
97. 1 Cal. 2d 1, 5, 33 P.2d 1, 3 (1934), as quoted in Armstrong, supra note 24, at
502-03.
98. Armstrong, supra note 24, at 501.
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in the absence of expressed legislative intent to the contrary,9' and that
"privileges and immunities, rather than due process considerations be-
came the major basis for the decision."'100 At no point in the opinion,
however, is the court critical of the doctrinal basis of the DPA. Indeed,
the court stated the question involved in the case to be
the competency of the state to pass such a statute in view of certain
clear, related, and co-ordinate inhibitions of section 1 of the 14th
amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the due
process provision of article 1, section 13, of ithe state Constitution.'
0'
Furthermore, it should be recalled that the court spoke of the applica-
bility of "two provisions of the 14th amendment;"' 02 the second of
these, mentioned immediately following the language quoted by Profes-
sor Armstrong, was the due process clause.10 3 It seems, therefore, that
while the holding in Thornton 11 may be based on alternative grounds,
and certainly is somewhat confusing, it does not represent nearly the
implied repudiation of the DPA which Professor Armstrong asserts." 4
This conclusion would seem to be affirmed by the fact that the supreme
court applied the DPA ten years after Thornton II, in Boyd v. Oser.10
Justice Langdon, in a strong dissent in Thornton 11,10 agreed that
"the section under consideration is unconstitutional in so far as it
attempts to diminish the husband's property rights during his lifetime
' . . but would have reached a different result on the facts of the
case. Since Mr. Thornton was dead, Justice Langdon viewed the case
solely as involving rights of intestate succession and testamentary dispos-
ition, with the widow's claim involving rights to succession under section
201 of the Probate Code, as broadened by the classificatory language of
section 164 of the Civil Code, representing the sole issue3'3
in Justice Langdon's words:
99. See Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 623, 145 P.2d 312, 318 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
100. Bodenheimer, supra note 46, at 580, citing Armstrong, supra note 24, at 502-03.
Professor Bodenheimer, if she does not agree with this interpretation, at least is
uncritical of it. See id. at 580-81.
101. 1 Cal. 2d 1, 4, 33 P.2d 1, 2 (1934) (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 5, 33 P.2d at 3.
103. Id.
104. The supreme court, in Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 564-65, 399 P.2d 897,
901, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1965), stated that: 'The underlying rationale of the majority
was the same in Thornton as it had been since Spreckels v. Spreckels...
105. 23 Cal. 2d 613, 145 P.2d 312 (1944).
106. 1 Cal. 2d 1, 5-7, 33 P.2d 1, 3-4 (1934) (Langdon, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 6, 33 P.2d at 3.
108. Id. at 6-7, 33 P.2d at 3.
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William Thornton is dead and has no property rights....
* * , The issue is whether the state of California may require that
upon the death of a decedent, certain property owned by him and
brought into this state shall be subject to the same rules of testamentary
disposition and succession as community property acquired in this state.
. . . [T]he rights of testamentary disposition and of succession are
wholly subject to statutory control, and may be enlarged, limited or
abolished without infinging upon the constitutional guaranty of due
process of law .... 109
In 1935, the legislature, following the theory of Justice Langdon's
dissent in Thornton II, adopted section 201.5 of the Probate Code.110
This section covers property within California's jurisdiction, which was
acquired by the decedent while domiciled elsewhere, but would have
been community property of the decedent and the surviving spouse had
they been domiciled in California at the time of the acquisition. It
provides that "upon the death" of a married person domiciled in Cali-
fornia, one half of such property "shall belong to the surviving spouse,"
the other one half being subject to the testamentary disposition of the
decedent, and descending to the surviving spouse in the event of intesta-
cy. 1
1
The section is contained in the Probate Code, and is phrased entirely
as a succession statute. There is no mention of "reclassification," and
the section is not operative until triggered by the occurrence of a crucial
event-death of a married person domiciled in California. At that
point, the state's interest in regulating succession rights of property
within its jurisdiction belonging to its deceased domiciliaries outweighs
any interest or expectation the decedent might have had in exercising
dead-hand control by way of testamentary disposition. Any property
which was separate property under the law of the domicile at the time of
acquisition (and which remained such) is distributed in a certain man-
ner (the same manner as community property). While the validity of
109. Id. (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that Justice Langdon apparently
viewed the majority's holding as based, at least in part, on grounds of denial of due
process.
110. Law of July 30, 1935, ch. 831, § 1, [1935] Cal. Stat. 2248 (now CAL. PRoB.
CODE ANN. § 201.5 (West 1956)).
ill. CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 201.5 (West 1956) (emphasis added).
The distributory scheme under this section is exactly the same as that for community
property under Probate Code section 201 (CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 201 (West 1956)),
and the property subject to distribution is the same as that which the legislature had
attempted to define as "community property" in the legislation declared unconstitutional
in Thornton 11.
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section 201.5 as a succession statute has been upheld,112 the DPA has
been applied to limit its applicability to cases where the spouse who
acquired the wealth while the parties were domiciled outside California
is the decedent.113 In a case where the non-acquiring spouse was the
decedent, and had attempted to leave half of the non-California source
property of the other spouse by will to someone else, Thornton 11 was
held controlling, and section 201.5 constitutionally could not apply."14
C. The Doctrine of Prospective Application and "Quasi-Community
Property" Legislation: Addison v. Addison
In 1961, the legislature deleted from section 164 of the Civil Code
the classificatory language relating to property acquired while domiciled
in another state," 5 which remained on the books notwithstanding the
decision in Thornton II, and added section 140.5 (as amended, section
4803) to the Civil Code."" The constitutionality of section 140.5 was
tested and upheld in 1965 in Addison v. Addison.
1 7
Section 140.5 defined as "quasi-community property"1 18 that proper-
ty within California's jurisdiction"' which would have been community
property had the acquiring spouse been domiciled in California at the
time of acquisition. Such property remains the separate property of the
acquiring spouse even after domicile is established in California, and is
not treated as "quasi-community property" until the occurrence of a
"crucial event" in California--dissolution of the marriage or legal sepa-
112. E.g., In re Miller, 31 Cal. 2d 191, 187 P.2d 722 (1947).
113. Paley v. Bank of America, 159 Cal. App. 2d 500, 324 P.2d 35 (1958).
114. Id. The reasoning is very similar to that in Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 145
P.2d 312 (1944), and McKay v. Lauriston, 204 Cal. 557, 269 P. 519 (1928).
115. Law of June 1, 1961, ch. 636, § 1, [1961] Cal. Stat. 1838 (now CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 5110 (West Supp. 1975)).
116. Law of June 1, 1961, ch. 636, § 2, [1961] Cal. Stat. 1838 (now CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 4803 (West Supp. 1975)).
117. 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal Rptr. 97 (1965).
118. The property defined as "quasi-community property" was, at the time of enact-
ment of section 140.5, exactly the same property dealt with, for purposes of succession,
by Probate Code section 201.5. CAL. PRoB. CODB ANt. § 201.5 (West 1956). Since
numerous other sections of the Civil Code refer to this class of property, it would be
cumbersome to include the not-altogether-elegant definitional language in every section
of reference, hence the term "quasi-community property." See CAL. Cirv. CODE §§ 4452,
4800, 4800.5, 4805, 4807, 4808, 4810, 5132 (West Supp. 1975).
119. The section has since been amended to include within the definition of "quasi-
community property" real property situated in other states, which is technically outside
California's jurisdiction. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4803 (West Supp. 1975). Special provision
is made for distribution of such property on dissolution, CAL. Civ. CoDn § 4800.5 (West
Supp. 1975).
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ration of the parties. 120  At that time, such property is divided in the
same manner as community property.
121
In Addison, 2 the parties moved to California in 1949, bringing with
them substantial assets accumulated as a result of the husband's business
enterprises in Illinois. These assets were the husband's property under
Illinois law, and thus were his separate property under California law.12 3
In a divorce action filed in 1961, Mrs. Addison urged the applicability
of the newly-enacted "quasi-community property" legislation to the
Illinois-source property in question. The supreme court, in an opinion
by Justice Peters, agreed, upholding the constitutionality of section
140.5. Although Addison overrules neither Spreckels nor Thornton,
Professor Knutson has stated that "both cases have lost their preceden-
tial value,"' 24 while Professor Bodenheimer has said that "there is no
question that [the] opinion taken in its entirety represents an almost
complete break with the past,"'125 and that "Justice Peters clearly over-
ruled the Spreckels case, whether he did so expressly or not.'
2 6
Justice Peters' opinion in Addison mentioned Spreckels only once in
connection with the due process argument:
The underlying rationale of the majority was the same in Thornton as it
had been since Spreckels v. Spreckels, . ..which established, by a
concession of counsel, that changes in the community property system
which affected "vested interests" could not constitutionally be applied
retroactively but must be limited to prospective application.
27
120. Civil Code section 4803 is silent on this point (CAL. Civ. CODE § 4803 (West
Supp. 1975)), but that is the necessary implication of Civil Code section 4804 (id. §
4804), and was the interpretation accorded the predecessor of section, 4103, section
140.5, by the supreme court in Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 566, 399 P.2d 897,
902, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102 (1965).
121. CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 4800, 4800.5 (West Supp. 1975).
122. 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965).
123. Id. at 561-62, 399 P.2d at 898-99, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 98-99; see In re Estate of
O'Connor, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031 (1933); Kraemer v. Kraemer, 52 Cal. 302
(1877); cf. George v. Ransom, 15 Cal. 322 (1860).
124. Knutson, supra note 46, at 271.
125. Bodenheimer, supra note 46, at 582.
126. Id. at 585.
127. 62 Cal. 2d 558, 564-65, 399 P.2d 897, 901, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1965). It is
clear that, in noting that the Spreckels decision was based on a concession of counsel,
Justice Peters was questioning the doctrinal validity of the DPA and even the preceden-
tial value of Spreckels. At only one other point, however, does the Addison opinion
mention Spreckels and the unbroken line of DPA cases which followed it. It was argued
in Addison that since, under the Spreckels doctrine, California held invalid legislation
which would alter the vested property rights of its own citizens, it must accord the same
treatment to citizens of other states under the privileges and immunities clause of article
1976]
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Justice Peters also noted that "the constitutional doctrine announced in
Estate of Thornton. . . has been questioned,"'28 and that its correct-
ness "is open to challenge,"'129 citing with apparent approval'8" Justice
Traynor's concurring opinion in Boyd v. Oser'8 ' and the learned com-
mentary of Professor Armstrong and others.'1 2
Rather than overrule Thornton II, however, the court in Addison
went on to distinguish it both in terms of the argument relating to denial
of due process and of an argument relating to alleged abridgement of
the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
basis of distinction is the same as to both constitutional arguments.' "
While the legislation at issue in Thornton was general classificatory
legislation,
the concept of quasi-community property is applicable . . . [o]nly if,
after acquisition of domicile in this state, certain acts or events occur
which give rise to an action for divorce or separate maintenance. These
acts or events are not necessarily connected with a change of domicile
at all.' 34
Without citation of authority, and without reference to the Spreckels
rule that marital property rights are fixed permanently by the law in
effect on the date of acquisition, Addison adopted a peculiar and
"unprecedented' ' 35 definition of retroactivity. It held that the legisla-
tion in question was being applied prospectively only, since it "neither
creates nor alters rights except upon divorce or separate mainte-
IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution. This argument was rejected, without
further reference to Spreckels, with the observation that:
"mhe privileges and immunities clause is not an absolute ... " In the case at
bar, [Mrs. Addison], as a former nondomiciliary of California, is a member of a
class of people who lost the protection afforded them in Illinois had they sought
a divorce there before leaving that state. . . . She has lost that protection, and is
thus in need of protection from California. Hence, the discrimination, if there be
such, is reasonable, and not of the type article IV of the federal Constitution seeks
to enjoin.
62 Cal. 2d at 568-69, 399 P.2d at 903-04, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 103-04.
128. Id. at 565, 399 P.2d at 901, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 101. Apparently the "constitutional
doctrine" to which Justice Peters refers is the DPA. The Spreckels rule was not directly
at issue in Addison, however, since the facts involved acquisitions of separate property
while domiciled in another state, and Mr. Addison was relying on Thornton 11.
129. Id. at 565-66, 399 P.2d at 901, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
130. Id. at 565, 399 P.2d at 901, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
131. Id. See Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 623, 145 P.2d 312, 31-8 (1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring).
132. 62 Cal. 2d at 565-66, 399 P.2d at 901, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
133. Id. at 566, 568, 399 P.2d at 902, 903, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 102, 103.
134. Id. at 566, 399 P.2d at 902, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
135. Knutson, supra note 46, at 270.
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nance,"'136 and "[t]he judgment of divorce was granted after the effec-
tive date of the legislation."'1 37
While the court thus managed to avoid a direct confrontation with
Spreckels, the fact remains that the property in question was the hus-
band's separate property under Illinois law and that, absent the legisla-
tion, it would have remained so under California law notwithstanding a
California divorce action, in which none of it would have been awarded
to the wife. Thus, there was "retroactive application," and the legisla-
tion operated to divest one spouse of property in which the other spouse
otherwise would have had no interest. This is recognized implicitly in
the court's earlier discussion of the due process problem.
Addison rejected the argument that the "quasi-community property"
legislation was violative of due process and thus unconstitutional, stating
that Mr. Addison "ha[d] not been deprived of a vested right without
due process."' 38  The court quoted with approval' 9 Professor Arm-
strong's due process analysis 40 to the effect that vested rights may be
impaired with due process of law, under the police power, the proper
test being "not whether a vested right is impaired by a marital property
law change, but whether such a change reasonably could be believed to
be sufficiently necessary to the public welfare as to justify the impair-
ment.",'41
The Addison court noted the "sociological problem!"42 to which the
"quasi-community property" legislation was addressed-that of the loss
of marital property rights associated with a change of domicile to
California. 143  It held-that "where the innocent party would otherwise
be left unprotected,"' 44 the state of the matrimonial domicile at the
136. 62 Cal. 2d at 569, 399 P.2d at 904, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
137. Id. The court in In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 593 n.10, 546 P.2d
1371, 1377 n.10, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 433 n.10 (1976), refers to the language from Ad-
dison quoted in the text as a "cryptic passage" by which the court "probably intended to
convey the modest message that the court was not applying the 1961 legislation in a
way that would disturb judgments handed down prior to its effective date on -the basis of
the then prevailing law."
138. Id. at 566, 399 P.2d at 902, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 102. Mr. Addison obviously, had
been deprived of a "vested right."
139. Id.
140. Armstrong, supra note 24, at 495-96; see notes 88-90 supra and accompanying
text.
141. Armstrong, supra note 24, at 496.
142. 62 Cal. 2d at 562, 399 P.2d at 899, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
143. Id. at 569, 399' P.2d at 904, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
144. Id. at 567, 399 P.2d at 903, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
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dissolution of the marriage has "a very substantial interest!' 45 in the
matrimonial property of the parties, so that it may "provide for a fair
and equitable distribution of the marital property"'14 without violating
the due process clauses of either the fourteenth amendment or the
California constitution. In support of its analysis of the state's substan-
tial interest, the court quoted a United States Supreme Court decision,
Williams v. North Carolina:
147
"Each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in
the marital status of persons domiciled within its borders. The mar-
riage relation creates problems of large social importance. Protection
of offspring, property interests, and the enforcement of marital respon-
sibilities are but a few commanding problems in the field of domestic
relations with which the state must deal."'
148
As a result of the due process analysis of Addison, Professor Knutson
has stated that "[tihe sweeping generalization that 'vested rights may
not be impaired or destroyed by subsequent legislation' is no longer the
law of California."'14 9 It is clear from Justice Peters' opinion that, while
Addison substituted a "modem" due process test for the dogmatic
approach of Spreckels and the other DPA cases, Professor Bodenhei-
mer's statement that "Justice Peters clearly overruled the Spreckels case
* ."0 .,ois far too sweeping.
Even though the Addison test is available as a measure of due process
for statutory enactments which alter management and control of com-
munity property, Addison is distinguishable from the DPA cases both
on its facts and in terms of the statute involved and does not overrule
Spreckels. Thus, while it holds that alterations in marital property
rights "are permissible on divorce in order to effectuate the State's
interest in providing for 'a fair and equitable division of the marital
property,' "s' it "is not helpful . . . [with regard to other] circum-
stances under which the spouses' interests in property can be altered by
retroactive enactments."' 2
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
148. Id. at 298, quoted in 62 Cal. 2d at 567, 399 P.2d at 902, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
149. Knutson, supra note 46, at 271, quoting McKay v. Lauriston, 204 Cal. 557, 269
P. 519 (1928).
150. Bodenheimer, supra note 46, at 585.
151. Knutson, supra note 46, at 271, quoting Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d at 567,
399 P.2d at 902, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
152. Knutson, supra note 46, at 271.
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The state's interest in terms of the "quasi-community property" legis-
lation lies in extending the protection of California law to an otherwise
unprotected spouse. This legislation applies to those cases in which the
property in question, had the parties been domiciled in California at the
time of acquisition, would have been viewed as having been acquired
through the co-equal contributions of the members of the marital part-
nership. Since the property thus would have been classified as commu-
nity property, rather than as the separate property of the spouse who
happened to be "in the marketplace," it is to be divided equally upon
dissolution. Even though Probate Code section 201.5 was upheld on
another theory-as a succession statute15" -the same interest-analysis is
applicable. At least one half 'of the defined property goes to the surviv-
ing spouse, as if it were community property. This disposition is
provided in order to prevent the decedent from making a testamentary
disposition of all of the otherwise separate property in favor of some
third party, which might leave the survivor penniless even though he or
she contributed to the acquisition as a member of the marital partner-
ship.
This same state interest-that of protecting the otherwise unprotect-
ed-is not present with respect to the recent management and control
amendments.1 54 Indeed, with one possible exception,1 55 these changes
do not appear to extend any additional "protection" to either spouse. 156
153. In re Miller, 31 Cal. 2d 191, 187 P.2d 722 (1947).
154. Compare CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 5125, 5127 (West Supp. 1975) with Former §§
5125, 5127, supra note 12. See also Former § 5124, supra note 13.
155. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 5125(e) (West Supp. 1975), which, for the first time,
codifies the duty of each spouse to act in "good faith" in the management and control of
the community property.
This sub-section is peculiar, in that, while it refers to "the" community property, it is
contained in the section relating to management and control of community personal
property; no similar provision appears in section 5127, the section relating to manage-
ment and control of community real property. Id. § 5127. It has been suggested that
section 5125(e) relates to the "business management" exception of section 5125(d).
Kahn & Frimmer, supra note 10, at 517-18; Reppy, supra note 10, at 1014-17; see CAL.
Civ. CODE § 5125(d) (West Supp. 1975); note 17 supra; notes 33 & 34 supra and ac-
companying text.
Moreover, the spouse exercising management and control of community property has
been held by the courts to be under a duty to act in "good faith." See Williams v.
Williams, 14 Cal. App. 3d 560, 92 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1971), and authorities cited therein.
Since the legislature could have used language in section 5125(e) similar to that in
section 5103, which specifically imposes the fiduciary duties of a trustee upon each
spouse with respect to inter-spousal agreements regarding property (CAL. Civ. CODB §
5103 (West 1970)), but did not do so, it is unclear to what extent section 5125(e) adds
anything to existing law. See Kahn & Frimmer, supra note 10, at 519.
156. Knutson, supra note 46, at 272, makes the point that the requisite state interest
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Thus, the availability of the Addison due process analysis does not
automatically pave the way for avoidance of the Spreckels result, even
though it softens or eliminates the dogmatic, deterministic approach of
Spreckels.
IV. DisCARDING THE DOCTRiNE: THE 1975 MANAGEMENT
AND CONTROL AMENDMENTS
A. The Doctrine of Prospective Application as a "Rule of Property":
The Police Power Argument
Justice Traynor argued that the DPA should be viewed as a "rule of
property" rather than a doctrine of constitutional necessity. 1 7 Accept-
ance of this proposition is implicit in Justice Peters' opinion in
Addison.158 Nonetheless, so long as one accepts the basic proposition
which led to the Spreckels result-that the right to management and
control of community property is itself a vested property right-the due
process argument remains. 5
Thus, in order to uphold the application of the 1975 management
and control amendments to all community property, whenever acquired,
would be present in an instance where a management and control amendment extended
additional protection to the non-managing spouse during the existence of the marriage.
Under pre-1975 law, as to community personal property, the non-managing spouse
was afforded protection by provisions prohibiting gifts of such property, under the
management and control of the other spouse, without his or her consent. Former §
5125, supra note 12; Former § 5124, supra note 13. Under the new law, with
community personal property generally under the management and control of "either
spouse," although section 5125 is rearranged and there are some changes in wording, that
basic protection seems to be continued unchanged. Compare Former § 5125, supra note
12, and Former § 5124, supra note 13, with CAL. Civ. CODE § 5125(b),(c) (West Supp.
1975).
As to community real property, the pre-1975 law afforded the wife protection by
requiring that she join in executing instruments by which such property was conveyed
(with or without consideration), leased for longer than one year, or encumbered. Former
§ 5127, supra note 12. The same protection is afforded each spouse under the new law
by its provision that, although "either spouse has the management and control of the
community real property," "both spouses" must join in executing any such instruments.
CAL. Crv. CODE § 5127 (West Supp. 1975).
157. Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 623, 145 P.2d 312, 318 (1944) (Traynor, I.,
concurring).
158. 62 Cal. 2d at 565-66, 399 P.2d at 901, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
159. Professor Bonanno, writing in 1974, accepts the basic proposition of Spreckels,
and seems to view the due process argument as formidable. Bonanno, supra note 10, at
102.
Professor Armstrong, while she did not view the due process argument as formidable
even in 1945, aoknowledged its presence even as she urged adoption of Justice Traynor's
position. 6'ee Armstrong, supra note 24, at 495-96, 505.
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it would be necessary to find that "retroactive application" of the
amendments was justified as a valid exercise of the "police power" for
the general welfare. In such case, rather than an impairment of proper-
ty rights without due process, there would be an impairment "with due
process"-i.e., no unconstitutional impairment.1"' Under the Addison
formulation, this would necessitate a finding that "retroactive applica-
tion" of the amendments" 'reasonably could be believed to be sufficiently
necessary to the public welfare as to justify the impairment,' "161 and
"an inquiry ... into whether, as applied, [the amendments are]
'capricious,' 'invidious,' or 'without rational and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation.' "162
The legislation extending application of the "equal rights" manage-
ment and control amendments to all community property, whenever
acquired,103 offers what can best be described as a "grab bag" of
justifications for the extension.' Among these are the findings that
the extension "entails important social and economic considerations,"' 16 5
"is necessary to achieve social and economic equality and facilitate
commercial transactions,"'' 66 and that "the right to manage and control
community property is not a fundamental right which may not be
divested by the Legislature ....
All of this may boil down to an assertion by the legislature that, even
though the right of a married person to management and control of.
previously acquired community property itself constitutes a property
right, the state's interest in promoting social and economic equality of
the spouses and facilitating commercial transactions' 68 is important
160. See Armstrong, supra note 24, at 495-96, 505.
161. 62 Cal. 2d at 566, 399 P.2d at 902, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 102, quoting Armstrong,
supra note 24, at 496.
162. Knutson, supra note 46, at 271.
163. CAL. Cr. CODE §§ 5125, 5127 (West Supp. 1975).
164. Law of Sept. 23, 1974, ch. 1206, § 1, [1974] Cal. Stats. 2609. These justifica-
tions are further discussed at text accompanying notes 282-92 infra. The present discus-
sion relates only to the due process argument.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. The present discussion will assume that this peculiar language constitutes
recognition that the right to management and control is a vested property right of some
sort, since otherwise there would be no due process issue. Further analysis of the quoted
language follows at notes 282-328 infra and accompanying text.
168. "Facilitating commercial transactions" apparently refers to the proposition that it
will be easier for married women to get credit after January 1, 1975, since "the liability
of community property for the debts of the spouses has been coextensive with the right
to manage and control community property. ... " Id. See Reppy, supra note 10, at
1007-08.
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enough to justify impairment of such previously vested rights as a valid
exercise of the police power.
The state's interest in promoting social and economic equality of
married persons with respect to their 69 community property should be
sufficient to justify impairment of the expectations of either spouse with
respect to exclusive management and control of community property
acquired prior to January 1, 1975.170 This may follow particularly
since, "[s]tatutory law notwithstanding,' 171 "a form of a joint and
several management system .... ,,,17" in which the parties "consult
closely concerning major purchases,"'173 "is, in fact, the system by which
most married couples today handle family finances."' 74
B. The Doctrine of Prospective Application as a
"Rule of Construction"
Since none of the earlier management and control amendments stated
a legislative intent that they be applied retroactively-that is, to commu-
Indeed, Civil Code section 5116 was amended to provide that: "The property of the
community is liable for the contracts of either spouse which are made after marriage and
prior to or on or after January 1, 1975." CAL. Civ. CODE § 5116 (West Supp. 1975).
Law of Sept. 23, 1974, ch. 1206, § 1 [1974] Cal. Stats. 2609 declares that this extension
of liability of community property for debts of the spouses "does not impair the rights of
creditors or the interests of the spouses. . . "
Professor Bonanno, writing prior to the enactment of the 1974 amendments, but after
enactment of the original "equal Tights" management and control amendments in 1973,
discusses the constitutional issues inherent in such extension of liability. See generally
Bonanno, supra note 10. He points out that "creditors can only benefit from the widest
possible extension to both spouses of management and control of the community
property," and characterizes creditors as "donee beneficiaries" of the management and
control amendments. Id. at 101.
In Community Property classes, this author, not entirely facetiously, has characterized
the amendments as the "Creditors' Rights Act of 1975." Professor Bonanno speaks of
the "strange alliance . . . that brings these conservatively oriented 'creditor-donee-
beneficiaries' and feminists together in the vanguard of the women's liberation move-
ment." Id.
169. Keeping in mind that, at least since 1927, the respective interests of the spouses
as to community property have been '!present, existing and equal." CAL. CiV. CoDn §
5105 (West Supp. 1975).
170. Mismanagement Litigation, supra note 9, at 737.
171. Bingaman: Equal Rights, supra note 2, at 44.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 45.
174. Id. at 44. Professor Armstrong argued that:
[Clompelling public policy considerations would support the legislature in making
any change in marital property rules which could reasonably be expected to work
an adjustment of the husband and wife's property interest which most spouses would
approve as more satisfactory and more equitable than the previous rule.
Armstrong, supra note 24, at 496.
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nity property (or the fruits thereof) acquired prior to their effective
dates-it was always possible for the courts to construe them as apply-
ing only prospectively. Professor Armstrong argued that the DPA was
merely a "rule of construction" which, "in deference to long usage
has become a rule of property."'
176
[T]he decisions which settled the meaning of each of the successive
changes while offering constitutional necessity as the supporting reason
for the extreme "prospective" operation construction which it applied,
could rest securely upon the basis of mere construction of legislative
intent. The legislature in no case presented wording which was
inescapably retrospective, and after a "prospective operation" construc-
tion by the courts, the legislature in no case altered the language of the
measure to make it read retrospectively and so force a facing of the
constitutional issue. .... 177
As to the 1975 management and control amendments, the legislature
has clearly indicated, both in the statutes themselves 178 and in a pream-
ble,179 its intent that they apply retroactively. So long as rights to
management and control of community property are viewed as "vested
property rights";8 0 however, such a declaration of legislative intent does
not solve the problem, but merely "force[s]. a facing of the constitution-
al issue."''s
C. The Impact of In re Marriage of Bouquet
In 1971, the legislature amended section 5118 of the Civil Code.1
8 2
The amendment provided that earnings and accumulations of either
spouse, while living separate and apart from the other spouse, would be
separate property. Prior to March 4, 1972, the effective date of the
amendment, earnings and accumulations of the wife living separate and
175. Armstrong, supra note 24, at 503-04.
176. Id. at 505.
177. Id. at 504.
178. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5125, 5127 (West Supp. 1975). See also CAL. Civ. CODE §
5116 (West Supp. 1975) (liability of community property for claims of creditors).
179. Law of Sept. 23, 1974, ch. 1206, § 1, [1974] Cal. Stat. 2609.
180. See Bonanno, supra note 10, at 102-03.
181. Armstrong, supra note 24, at 504.
182. Law of Dec. 10, 1971, ch. 1699, § 1, [1971] Cal. Stat. 3640, as amended CAL.
Crv. CoDE § 5118 (West Supp. 1975). Former section 5118 (CAL. Cv. CODE § 5118
(West 1970)) was enacted as part of the Family Law Act (Law of Sept. 6, 1969, ch.
1608, § 8, [1969] Cal. Stat. 3342), and was based on long-standing prior law. See CAL.
Crv. COnn § 169 (1872). Section 5118 represents an exception to the general rule that
acquisitions during marriage are community property. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110
(West Supp. 1975).
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apart were her separate property, but those of the husband were com-
munity property, to which the "present, existing and equal" interest of
the wife attached at the time of acquisition. Although the amendment
did not, on its face, provide for retroactive application, the California
Supreme Court, in In re Marriage of Bouquet,183 accepted Mr. Bou-
quet's claim for retroactive application and held that his earnings,
acquired from the date of separation in 1969 to the date of dissolution
in 1972, were his separate property.
This contention had been rejected by the trial court, which found that
the law in effect on the date of acquisition controlled as to classification
of the property in question.'8 4 The court of appeal affirmed, 85 finding
retroactive application of amended section 5118 unjustified even though
the amendment functioned to accord to the husband's earnings the same
treatment as that previously accorded those of the wife. 80 It based its
decision on two grounds. First, noting that the statute was silent on its
face as to retroactivity, the court invoked the "fundamental rule" of
statutory construction that "a statute will not be construed to operate
retroactively unless the legislative intent cannot otherwise be satis-
fied," 7 or, stated another way, "that a statute will not be deemed
retroactive unless such intent clearly appears from the statute itself."1 8
Second, the court held that in the absence of a showing of a proper
exercise of the police power, purported retroactive application of marital
property legislation so as to impair vested rights of the spouses would
fall within the Spreckels"" rule as a deprivation of property without
due process. 190 As to this latter point, the court stated:
[Elven if we accept the proposition that the traditional police power of
the state does include the right to interfere with vested property rights
and that this right extends to a possible impairment of the vested rights
of the spouses by a marital property law change . . ., it is manifestly
clear that even under Addison such divestiture or impairment of vested
rights may be justified only whenever it is necessary to protect health,
safety, morals or general well-being of the people. [A]ppellant fall[s]
fatally short of indicating that the suggested retroactive application of
183. 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976).
184. Id. at 586, 546 P.2d at 1372, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
185. In re Marriage of Bouquet, 119 Cal. Rptr. 67 (Ct. App. 1975).
186. Id. at 68-69.
187. Id. at 68, citing, e.g., Balen v. Peralta Junior College Dist., 11 Cal. 3d 821, 828,
523 P.2d 629, 633, 114 Cal. Rptr. 589, 593 (1974).
188. Id. at 69.
189. Spreckels v. Spreckles, 116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228 (1897).
190. 119 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
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amended section 5118 would promote the above described aims to any
extent. It goes without saying that in the absence of such showing the
purported retroactive application would be altogether ineffective even
if such intent had been clearly expressed by the Legislature. 91
Since "[tihe status of property as community or separate is normally
determined at the time of its acquisition,"'192 retroactive application of
amended section 5118 in Bouquet clearly affected ownership rights. As
the husband had earned money from the date of separation to the
effective date of the amendment, it had been classified as community
property, to which "vested property rights"'193 of the wife attached.
Professor Reppy, writing after the court of appeal decision in Bouquet,
noted that "the clearest property-taking would result' 194 from retroac-
tive application of the amendment, and expressed surprise that the
supreme court granted a hearing. 95 Nonetheless, it was obvious when
the hearing was granted that the supreme court opinion could be of
immense import in terms of the 1975 management and control amend-
ments.
A decision by the supreme court that amended section 5118 could
not operate retroactively may have been based on either of two
grounds. Neither ground necessarily would have meant that the man-
agement and control amendments could not so apply. The supreme court
might have held that amended section 5118 could not apply retroactively
simply because legislative intent in that regard was lacking, leaving open
the question as to what the decision would have been had there been
expressed legislative intent. Since the legislature expressed retroactive
intent in the management and control amendments,' 96 such a narrow
holding in Bouquet would have been inapplicable to future litigation
concerning the retroactivity of sections 5125 and 5127.- 97 Alternative-
ly, the court might have held that amended section 5118 could not have
applied retroactively even if the legislature had so intended. But this
broader holding need not have meant that amended sections 5125 and
5127 could not so apply, since retroactive application of amended
section 5118 clearly affects ownership, while retroactive application of
191. Id. (citations omitted).
192. In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr.
427, 432 (1976).
193. Id.; CAL. Civ. CobE § 5105 (West Supp. 1975).
194. Reppy, supra note 10, at 1080-81, n.335.
195. Id.
196. Law of Sept. 23, 1974, ch. 1206, § 1, [1974] Cal. Stat. 2609; CAL. Civ. CODE H8
5125, 5127 (West Supp. 1975).
197. CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 5125, 5127 (West Supp. 1975).
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the management and control amendments arguably does not. 0 8 How-
ever, the supreme court held first, that the legislature intended the
amendment to operate retroactively, and second, that such retroactive
application would not constitute a deprivation of property without due
process, "[n]otwithstanding the fact that it denudes the wife of certain
vested property rights. .. .109
The supreme court had to find that the legislature intended amended
section 5118 to apply retroactively before reaching the due process
issue. Since legislative intent in that regard is express in the manage-
ment and control amendments, the first part of the Bouquet opinion is
not technically relevant to the present discussion. It is worthy of brief
note, however, since it reveals the court's determination to reach the due
process issue.2"'
The supreme court noted the general presumption against retroactive
application of statutes,201 but stated that it must be "subordinated ...
to the transcendent canon of statutory construction that the design of the
Legislature be given effect.' 20 2 Relying on In re Estrada,03 the court
stated that" '[w]here the Legislature has not set forth in so many words
what it intended,' ",204 the presumption against retroactive application of
an amendment "'is to be applied only after, considering all pertinent
factors, it is determined that it is impossible to ascertain the legislative
intent.' ",205 Conceding the issue to be "a close one,"200 the court
198. As to this point, see the discussion beginning at text accompanying notes 289-
316 infra.
199. 16 Cal. 3d at 591-92, 546 P.2d at 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
200. Reppy states that in analyzing the California cases dealing with the general pre-
sumption against retroactivity, "one can find support for a strong or weak presumption
to enable the court to reach the desired result." Reppy, supra note 10, at 1009 n.114.
201. 16 Cal. 3d at 587, 546 P.2d at 1372, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
202. Id. at 587, 546 P.2d at 1373, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
203. 63 Cal. 2d 740, 408 P.2d 948, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1965).
204. 16 Cal. 3d at 587, 546 P.2d at 1373, 128 Cal. Rptr. 429, quoting In re Estrada,
63 Cal. 2d 740, 746, 408 P.2d 948, 952, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172, 176 (1965).
205. Id. (emphasis deleted). This interpretation of the presumption finds support in
other cases. See, e.g., Reppy, supra note 10, at 1009 n.1 14, and cases cited therein. The
court's reliance on Estrada and treatment of the presumption as "weak" was predicted
by Professor Reppy as to certain provisions of the 1975 reform legislation where legisla-
tive intent was unclear. See id. at 1029. I suspect, however, that he would not have
predicted the same treatment in Bouquet, since the legislation at issue clearly involved
a "taking." See id. at 1080-81 n.335. The court also ignored the language of such cases
as, for example, Balen v. Peralta Junior College Dist., 11 Cal. 3d 821, 828, 523 P.2d
629, 622, 114 Cal. Rptr. 589, 593 (1974), and Di Genova v. State Bd. of Educ., 57
Cal. 2d 167, 367 P.2d 865, 18 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1962).
206. 16 Cal. 3d at 588, 546 P.2d at 1373, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
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examined the "pertinent factors" and found two indicators of legislative
intent that the statute apply retroactively. In the absence of conflicting
indicia, the court concluded that "the Legislature intended amended
section 5118 to operate retroactively.
'20 7
One of these indicia of legislative intent, upon which Mr. Bouquet
primarily relied, was a letter from Assemblyman Hayes, author of the
bill which amended section 5118, to Senator Mills, President Pro Tem-
pore of the Senate. 2 8  The letter was printed in the Senate Journal
pursuant to a resolution passed on the motion of Senator Grunsky.20°
Even though the letter was "irrelevant" insofar as the personal views of
Assemblyman Hayes were concerned,210 it was indicative of legislative
intent in two ways. First, it cast "some light on the shrouded legislative
history of the amendment. 211 Since Assemblyman Hayes stated in the
letter that it was his intention that the amendment apply retroactively,
and that "was the argument [he] used in obtaining passage of the
measure . . . ,"212 the letter supported retroactive application of the
amendment by shedding light upon the legislative debates; in turn,
"[d]ebates surrounding the enactment of a bill may illuminate its
interpretation. 21 3 Second, Senator Grunsky's motion, while technically
a motion to print, clearly indicated that the letter was to be printed as a
"letter of legislative intent.
214
Mr. Bouquet also suggested that a "pertinent factor" supporting
retroactivity of amended section 5118 was the "patent unconstitutionali-
ty" of its predecessor. 215  Although the constitutionality of the prior
statute was not at issue, the supreme court observed that
it would be subject to strong constitutional challenge. Prior to the
amendment, section 5118 blatantly discriminated against the husband
during periods of separation: the earnings of the wife were her separate
property while those of the husband belonged to the community. It
seems doubtful that the state could conjure a rational relation between
this unequal treatment and any legitimate state interest. It is even less
207. Id. at 591, 546 P.2d at 1375-76, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 431-32.
208. The letter is reprinted in a footnote to the court's opinion. Id. at 589 n.5, 546
P.2d at 1374 n.5, 128 Cal. Rptr. 430 n.5.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 589, 546 P.2d at 1374, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
211. Id. at 590, 546 P.2d at 1374-75, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 430-3-1.
212. Id. at 589 n.5, 546 P.2d at 1374 n.5, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 430 n.5.
213. Id. at 590, 546 P.2d at 1373, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 588, 546 P.2d at 1373, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
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likely that the state could sustain the greater showing required by our
recognition that sex based classifications are inherently suspect. 210
Since the legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial decisions, the
court assumed that it was aware of "the dubious constitutional stature of
the sexually discriminating old law. ' 217  It was therefore reasonably
inferrable that "the Legislature wished to replace the possibly infirm law
with its constitutionally unobjectionable successor as soon as possi-
ble." s  This inference as to legislative intent may be somewhat less
reasonable in light of the fact that other features of the community
property system as it existed at the time of the amendment to section
5118-particularly those dealing with management and control and
creditors' rights-also were of dubious constitutionality. 210  Yet, as to
those features, the legislature conducted extensive hearings220 prior to
enactment of the original "equal rights" management and control/credi-
tors' rights bill in 1973,221 the effectiveness of which was delayed until
1975. Then, in 1974, the legislature acted specifically to provide for
retroactivity of those reforms.222
One might wish for more than weak or speculative circumstantial
evidence of legislative intent that a statute be applied retroactively-
particularly when, as a result of a finding of such intent, the supreme
court is forced to face the issue of whether retroactive application effects
a "taking" in the constitutional sense. Indeed, it would seem that a court
normally would avoid the constitutional issue whenever possible by
applying a rather strict presumption against retroactivity in cases where
the legislature's intent is neither expressed nor strongly indicated.
223
Even though the constitutionality of former section 5118 was not at
issue in Bouquet, the court clearly indicated its feeling that, prior to the
216. Id.
217. Id. The only case cited by the court in discussing the "dubious constitutional
stature" of the old law is Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 329 (1971). The amendment to section 5118 was enacted on December 10, 1971
(Law of Dec. 10, 1971, ch. 1699, § 1, [1971] Cal. Stat. 3640). AB 1549, introduced
by Assemblyman Hayes on April 2, 1971, predated the decision in Sail'er Inn, which was
rendered on May 27, 1971. Bouquet fails to note these facts.
218. 16 Cal. 3d at 588, 546 P.2d at 1374, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 430. While the inference
was "hardly conclusive," it was "of some value in ascertaining the Legislature's intent."
Id. The court had earlier labeled Mr. Bouquet's argument on this point "somewhat spec-
ulative," (id.) so that we wind up with a "somewhat speculative reasonable inference."
219. See, e.g., Management and Control, supra note 1, at 899-906; see generally notes
4-7 supra and accompanying text.
220. Mismanagement Litigation, supra note 9, at 723-24 & n.4.
221. Law of Oct. 1, 1973, ch. 987, [19731 Cal. Stat. 1897.
222. Law of Sept. 23, 1974, ch. 1206, [1974] Cal. Stat. 2609.
223. See Reppy, supra note 10, at 1009.
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amendment, the section was violative of equal protection. 2 4  This
feeling may explain why the court was willing to find retroactive intent
on the basis of weak indicia and go on to dispose of the due process
issue.
The court noted that "[t]he vesting of property rights . . .does not
render them immutable . .. ,"25 and that in many instances the police
power justifies the impairment of property rights "' "with due process of
law." '"226 Examples of factors to be considered in determining wheth-
er a retroactive law is violative of due process are
the significance of the state interest served by the law, the importance
of the retroactive application of the law to the effectuation of that
interest, the extent of reliance upon the former law, the legitimacy of
that reliance, the extent of actions taken on the basis of that reliance,
and the extent to which the retroactive application of the new law
would disrupt those actions. 2
27
None of the enumerated factors dealing with reliance are mentioned
again except in a footnote, where the supreme court stated that "the un-
fairness of the former law also casts doubt upon the legitimacy of reliance
upon it."'225 Apparently no reliance was alleged. No facts except for
names and dates are mentioned in the opinion, and the wife agreed that
the amended section could be applied retroactively if such application
was "necessary to subserve a sufficiently important state interest, '229 al-
though she obviously contended that no such interest was involved.230
In discussing the state's interest in retroactive application of amended
section 5118, the court noted the "peculiar congruence" 23 1 between
Bouquet and Addison,28 2 and stated that Addison "conclusively estab-
lishes the constitutionality of applying amended section 5118 retroac-
224. See quotation in text accompanying note 217 supra. See also 16 Cal. 3d at 594
n.11, 546 P.2d at 1377 n.11, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 433 n.11, where the court speaks of the
"patent unfairness of former section 5118."
225. 16 Cal. 3d at 592, 546 P.2d at 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
226. Id., quoting Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 566, 399 P.2d 897, 901, 43
Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1965), quoting Armstrong, supra note 24, at 495.
227. 16 Cal. 3d at 592, 546 P.2d at 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
228. Id. at 594 n.11, 546 P.2d at 1377 n.11, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 433 n.11.
229. Id. at 593, 546 P.2d at 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
230. Id. at 593, 546 P.2d at 1377, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 433. See text accompanying
notes 251-52 infra.
231. Id. at 594, 546 P.2d at 1378, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
232. Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965).
For an extended discussion of Addison and the legislation at issue therein see notes 115-
56 supra and accompanying text.
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tively. '' 23 3  Since "Addison involved a factual pattern almost identical to
that of the present case," 234 retroactive application could be sustained
"without protracted discussion." 2 5  In Addison, "[t]he state's para-
mount interest in the equitable distribution of marital property upon
dissolution of the marriage . . . justified the impairment of the hus-
band's vested property rights. ' 231 The court held that the same state
interest justified infringement of the wife's vested property rights in
Bouquet.
[1Hiere, as in Addison, the Legislature reallocated property rights in
the course of its abiding supervision of marital property and dissolu-
tions. Moreover, the legislation sprang in both cases from an apprecia-
tion of the rank injustice of the former law. The calculus of the costs
and benefits of the retroactive application of amended section 5118,
therefore, does not differ significantly from that implicit in
Addison.... The divestiture of the wife's property rights in the instant
case is no more a taking of property without due process of law than
was the divestiture of the husband's property rights in Addison. The
state's interest in the equitable dissolution of the marital relationship
supports this use of the police power to abrogate rights in marital
property that derived from the patently unfair former law.
237
The court's emphasis on the "unfairness" of former section 5118
must be considered in light of its earlier observations as to the probable
constitutional infirmity of the section.238 Read in that light, the opinion
means that the state's power to regulate the marital relationship extends
to the divestiture of one spouse's property rights, in the interest of
equality, when those rights had vested under a statute which was so
patently "unfair" that it probably was unconstitutional. The opinion
could be more broadly construed as suggesting that the legislature has
plenary power to divest property rights when the law under which those
rights vested is found, by the legislature or the court, to have been
"unfair."23 9  There is danger in such an interpretation, 24e seemingly
233. 16 Cal. 3d at 593, 546 P.2d at 1377, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 594, 546 P.2d at 1378, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
236. Id. at 593, 546 P.2d at 1377, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
237. Id. at 594, 546 P.2d at 1377-78, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 433-34 (footnote omitted).
238. See text accompanying notes 217 & 224 supra.
239. This interpretation is possible since it was the Bouquet court, not the legislature,
that made the finding of "unfairness." The legislature made no findings at all. More-
over, the court never looked to the history of former section 5118 to determine whether
there was a legitimate reason for the classificatory distinctions between the earnings and
accumulations of husbands and wives during periods of separation. The reason probably
had to do with the husband's general duty to support the wife under California Civil
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invited by the court's broadly worded opinion, which "overapplies"
Addison. The narrower interpretation suggested above more properly
places Bouquet in line with Addison.
Of all the cases discussed in this article, beginning with Spreckels, 241
Bouquet cites only Addison and the concurring opinion of Justice
Traynor in Boyd v. Oser.242 While citing Professor Reppy as one
authority for the list of factors to be considered in determining whether
retroactive application of a statute violates due process, 243 the court
ignored his discussion of the Bouquet case itself.244 The court also
ignored Jacquemart v. Jacquemart245 and Ottinger v. Ottinger,246 two
appellate court cases which held that legislation very similar to that at
issue in Bouquet could not apply retroactively.2 47  Bouquet thus seems
Code section 5130, which was not repealed until January 1, 1975. Law of Sept. 23,
1974, ch. 1206, § 6, [1974] Cal. Stat. 2609. It may also have had to do with historical,
economic reality (i.e., more husbands than wives had earnings) and sexist assumptions.
See generally DEFuNuAK & VAUGHN, supra note 2, at 328-30. For criticism of statutes
such as former section 5118 see generally id. at 108-12.
240. As an extreme example, suppose the legislature, in a frenzy of individualism, de-
cided that it disapproved the basic theory of community property, since it was "unfair"
that the contributions of a spouse who either was not "in the marketplace" or was earn-
ing less than the other spouse should be considered co-equal as a matter of law to the
contributions of the latter. The legislature therefore decided to abolish the community
property system, the abolition to apply retroactively. Since the prior law was "unfair,"
would the state's "abiding supervision of marital property," justify retroactive divestiture
of all community pr6perty rights not finally adjudicated "without protracted discussion"'
by the court? Would the answer depend on the court's opinion as to what was and was
not "fair"?
241. Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228 (1897).
242. 23 Cal. 2d 613, 623, 145 P.2d 312, 318 (1944).
243. 16 Cal. 3d at 592, 546 P.2d at 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 432, citing, e.g., Reppy,
supra note 10, at 1048-49.
244. Reppy, supra note 10, at 1080-81 n.335; see text accompanying notes 194-95
supra.
245. 125 Cal. App. 2d 122, 269 P.2d 951 (1954).
246. 141 Cal. App. 2d 220, 296 P.2d 347 (1956).
247. Iacquemart involved former section 169.1 of the Civil Code (enacted by Law
of July 23, 1951, ch. 1700, § 12, [1951] Cal. Stat. 3913) which provided that a hus-
band's earnings after a decree of separation, which had been classified as community
property under prior law, were to be classified as separate property. Ottinger involved
former section 175 of the Civil Code (enacted by Law of May 13, 1955, ch. 525, § 1,
[1955] Cal. Stat. 999). Prior to that enactment, the husband's earnings were classified
as community property in all instances where the parties were living separate and apart;
section 175 provided that his earnings were to be classified as separate property in cases
where he had been unjustifiably abandoned by his wife, and prior to an offer by her
to return. In each case, the wife's earnings in the same situation had always been clas-
sified as separate property. Thus, each case would be decided differently even under
the narrow interpretation of Bouquet suggested in the text.
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to consign three quarters of a century of California jurisprudence to the
scrap-heap of legal history with neither precise analysis nor even a
nostalgic (if not fond) farewell wave. While there is respected opin-
ion 48 to the effect that Addison overruled, for example, Spreckels and
Thornton I1,249 it must be recalled that Addison distinguished Thornton
11 and never expressly overruled any prior cases. 250
In Spreckels, counsel for the wife conceded that "if the husband is the
owner of the property, then a statute which makes the right to dispose of
it subject to the will of another is unconstitutional."2 " In Bouquet,
counsel for the wife agreed "that amended section 5118 can be applied
retroactively if such a retroactive application is necessary to subserve a
sufficiently important state interest. ' 252 Thus, just as the concession of
counsel in Spreckels obviated the need for discussion of the due process
issue, counsel in Bouquet seems to have conceded on every aspect of the
due process issue except for that of the importance of the state's interest.
Having noted that "Addison involved a factual pattern almost identi-
cal to that of the present case,''253 and the "State's paramount interest in
the equitable distribution of marital property upon dissolution of the
marriage,"2 54 the court went on to state, in a footnote:
We observed in Addison that "where the innocent party would
otherwise be left unprotected the state has a very substantial interest
and one sufficient to provide for a fair and equitable distribution of the
marital property without running afoul of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." The patent unfairness of former section
5118 surely makes this an appropriate case for the use of the police
power to redress retroactively inequitable property rules.2 55
The enactment of the "quasi-community property" legislation, consid-
ered in Addison,256 was necessary for the protection of the non-acquir-
ing spouse. Upon death of the acquiring spouse or dissolution of the
marriage, the non-acquiring spouse had lost whatever protection he or
she would have had under the law of the former marital domicile due to
removal of the marital domicile to California. This was so because the
248. Bodenheimer, supra note 46, at 585; see Knutson, supra note 46, at 271.
249. In re Estate of Thornton, 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934).
250. See notes 124-26, 133-34 supra and accompanying text.
251. 116 Cal. at 349, 49P. at 231.
252. 16 Cal. 3d at 593, 546 P.2d at 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 432. See text accompany-
ing notes 229-30 supra.
253. Id. at 593, 546 P.2d at 1377, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 594 n.11, 546 P.2d at 1377 n.11, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 433 n.11.
256. CAL. Civ. CoD § 4803 (West 1970); CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 201.5 (West
1956).
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California courts, applying the "tracing" or "source" doctrine of conflict
of laws,25 classified the property according to the law of the domicile at
the time of acquisition.258  However, California law (the law of the
forum and current domicile) was deemed controlling as to distribution
of property upon death 259 or divorce. 260  Thus, looking to the law of
State X, the domicile at the date of acquisition, the California courts
would note that State X was not a community property state, and
classify the property, even though earned during marriage, as the sepa-
rate property of the acquiring spouse. The courts then applied Califor-
nia law as to distribution of the property. However, as to California
separate property, the non-acquiring spouse has no protection on the
testate death of the acquiring spouse or upon dissolution of the mar-
riage, since the community property system substitutes for the common-
law or other statutory schemes of marital property rights. As to the
same property, had the parties remained domiciled in State X, the non-
acquiring spouse would have been protected by the laws of State X in
the event of death of the acquiring spouse, 61 and may well have been
protected in the event of dissolution. 62 Thus, the non-acquiring spouse
lost the protection afforded by the law of State X and was unprotected
under California law because of the California courts' characterization
of the property according to the law of State X and distribution accord-
ing to California law.2 63 The "quasi-community property" legislation
257. RE STATEMiENT OF CONFLICt OF LAWS §§ 290-91 (1934).
258. E.g., In re Estate of Thornton, 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934); In re Estate of
O'Connor, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031 (1933); In re Estate of Niccolls, 164 Cal. 368,
129 P. 278 (1912); Latterner v. Latterner, 121 Cal. App. 298, 8 P.2d 870 (1932).
259. E.g., In re Estate of O'Connor, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031 (1933); In re Estate
of Niccolls, 164 Cal. 368, 129 P. 278 (1912).
260. Latterner v. Latterner, 121 Cal. App. 298, 8 P.2d 870 (1932).
261. E.g., In re Estate of Thomson, 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934) ("dower" rights
in Montana); In re Estate of O'Connor, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031 (1933) (widow's
one third forced share in Indiana).
262. "[Aflany common law jurisdictions have provided for the division of the separate
property of the respective spouses in a manner which is 'just and reasonable' . . . ."
Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 567, 399 P.2d 897, 902, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102
(1965).
263 A recent Arizona dissolution case, Rau v. Rau, 432 P.2d 910 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1967), solved this problem by distributing the State X source property according to
the law of State X. The California courts never reached this eminently sensible result-
perhaps because the legislature recognized the problem so early that subsequent litigation
centered on the constitutionality of the corrective legislation. Arizona subsequently en-
acted "quasi-community property" legislation applicable to dissolution cases-perhaps in
the interest of uniformity of distribution; perhaps because, in Rau, part of the property
distributed "equitably" under Illinois law would have been the wife's separate property
even under Arizona law. See Asuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (Supp. 1973).
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was designed as a partial remedy 264 for this stiuation.
In Addison, the legislation afforded the wife an interest in property
which was the husband's property under Illinois law, but which would
have been community property had the parties been domiciled in Cali-
fornia at the time of acquisition. Had the parties remained in Illinois,
she would have been protected upon dissolution. 215 Clearly there could
have been no constitutional objection had a California court, under
choice-of-law principlies, decided to apply Illinois law and effect an
"equitable division" of the property.260 The only issue presented in
Addison was the constitutionality of remedial legislation, designed to
effect uniformly "equitable divisions" without constant reference to the
laws of other jurisdictions, and designed to extend protection to the
otherwise unprotected.
26r
As far as can be determined from the few facts available in Bouquet,
the facts of Bouquet and Addison are not "almost identical." Addison
substituted "modern" due process analysis for the dogma of Spreckels
and its progeny. Beyond that, the analysis set forth above reveals that
Addison is of no help in deciding Bouquet. It is not enough simply to
state that "the legislation sprang in both cases from an appreciation of
the rank injustice of the former law. '268  Amended section 5118 may or
may not have sprung from such an appreciation. The court had no way
of knowing. The legislative history of the amendment is "shrouded,"10 9
and Assemblyman Hayes's letter is silent on that point.270 The only
possible connection between the "unfair" former law and the legisla-
ture's motives in enacting the new law was the court's assumption, based
264. Probate Code section 201.5 would not have remedied the situation in In re Estate
of O'Connor, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031 (1933), since in that case the property was
owned by the husband prior to marriage (and thus would have been his separate property
even under California law), and the wife's one third forced share under Indiana law
was characterized by the California court as not "vested." See CAL. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 201.5 (West 1956). But see Rau v. Rau, 432 P.2d 910, 914 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967):
If the mere act of removal of property from Illinois to Arizona could destroy an
interest of the wife in that property, whether we call that interest "vested" or not,
we conceive that any cry of lack of due process would have a clearer ring if voiced
by the wife.
265. See authorities cited in the Addison opinion, 62 Cal. 2d at 567 n.11, 399 P.2d
at 902 n.11, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 102 n.11; see also Yoselle v. Yoselle, 204 N.E.2d 129 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1964).
266. See Rau v. Rau, 432 P.2d 910 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967); notes 263-64 supra.
267. Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 566-67, 399 P.2d 897, 901-02, 43 Cal. Rptr.
97, 101-02 (1965).
268. 16 Cal. 3d at 594, 546 P.2d at 1377, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
269. Id. at 591, 546 P.2d at 1374, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
270. Id. at 589 n.5, 546 P.2d at 1374 n.5, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 430 n.5.
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on the husband's equal protection argument, that there was a connec-
-ion.
Nor is it enough simply to state that "[tihe divestiture of the wife's
property rights in the instant case is no more a taking of property
without due process of law than was the divestiture of the husband's
property rights in Addison."'2 71 That is simply a statement of the issue
in terms of a conclusion. 72 Addison involved an extension of the
protection of the community property system to a class of persons
otherwise unprotected. Bouquet involved a withdrawal of protection.
The property in question was defined under the old law as community
property, as to which the wife had a one-half interest; under the new
law, it was defined as the husband's separate property, as to which she
had no interest. Seen in that light, the issue was whether the protection
of the marital property system may be withdrawn from a person whose
rights have vested under the law previously in force. Addison obviously
is not helpful in answering that question; nor should the mere fact that
the law previously in force was "unfair" dictate an affirmative answer-
surely not all property rights may be divested simply because they vested
under a law subsequently deemed "unfair."
Since Addison clearly can not be said to be controlling on the facts,
the only possible explanation for the Bouquet decision seems to be the
court's opinion that former section 5118 was violative of equal protec-
tion,27 and that such unconstitutionality was so obvious that California
wives could not legitimately have relied upon "vested rights" acquired
under it.274  Unfortunately for the cause of clarity in jurisprudential
development, the court clearly states that Addison is controlling,
275 yet
271. Id. at 594, 546 P.2d at 1378, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
272. The issue is whether property rights, even though "vested," may be divested in the
particular case. It is not helpful to say that "since property rights may be divested
[in Addison] they may be divested [in Bouquet]."
273. 16 Cal. 3d at 588, 546 P.2d at 1373, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 429. See text accompany-
ing notes 217, 224, 238 supra.
274. 16 Cal. 3d at 594 n.11, 546 P.2d at 1377 n.11, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 433 n.11. Former
section 5118 and its predecessor, section 169, had been continuously in force as the law
of California since 1872. Sailer Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 329 (1971). The federal equal protection cases cited in note 5 supra, which
have been most often used to support arguments that certain features of the California
community property system were unconstitutional, were all decided since 1971. The
Equal Rights Amendment was passed by Congress in 1972. H.RJ. Res. 208, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1972). It is difficult to see how reliance on former section 5118 would have
been unjustified.
275. 16 Cal. 3d at 593, 594, 546 P.2d at 1377, 1378, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 433, 434.
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its opinion as to the unconstitutionality of former section 5118 is
rendered in connection with the husband's legislative intent argu-
ment.2 78 This part of the opinion is bootstrapped into the due process
discussion in a footnote,2 77 where the court's opinion as to the legitimacy
of reliance on the former section is also tucked away.
2 78
If, after Addison, there was any doubt as to whether retroactive
application of the 1975 management and control amendments would be
upheld, it has been dispelled by Bouquet. Given the expressed retroac-
tive intent of the legislature in the 1975 management and control
amendments, 7 and their goal of achieving social and economic equality
and facilitating credit transactions,28 a Bouquet/Addison due process
approach certainly means that the court will uphold retroactive applica-
tion. In fact, since legislative intent would not be at issue, the Bouquet
approach to such a case could lead to a per curiam opinion saying little
more than "Bouquet is obviously controlling. (See also Addison.)"
Further, even if the right to management and control of community
property is viewed as a property right, the legislature's expressed intent,
and the supporting reasons therefore 281 will certainly lead the court,
applying Bouquet, to a decision allowing retroactive application. It is
submitted, however, that the husband never should have been consid-
ered the "sole owner" of the community property, and that the right to
management and control is not a "property right." When the issue
arises, it is hoped that the court will not simply sweep Spreckels under the
rug, but will, instead, write a searching opinion disposing of erroneous
doctrine once and for all. The next section proposes alternative
grounds for decision.
D. An Alternate Ground for Decision: The Right to Management and
Control of Community Property is Not a "Vested Property Right" in
California
If the right to management and control of community property is not
a "vested property right," then any legislation adjusting management
and control rights, clearly intended to operate "retroactively," should so
operate. So long as the legislation did not purport to affect transactions
276. Id. at 588, 546 P.2d at 1373, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
277. Id. at 594 n.11, 546 P.2d at 1377 n.11, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 433 n.11.
278. Id.
279. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 5125, 5127 (West Supp. 1975).
280. Law of Sept. 23, 1974, ch. 1206, § 1, [1974] Cal. Stat. 2609.
281. See notes 22-24, 163-74 supra and accompanying text.
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entered into prior to its effective date,282 no constitutional question
would arise.
In its "grab bag" of justifications for "retroactive" application of the
1975 amendments, the legislature used somewhat confusing language
which may leave doubt as to whether it considers a property right to be
involved. 213  According to the preamble to the "retroactivity bill" enact-
ed in 1974,
the right to manage and control community property is not a funda-
mental right which may not be divested by the Legislature and is not
accorded the same status as the ights of the spouses in community
property during marriage which are, and remain, present, existing, and
equal .... 284
To say that the right is not one "which may not be divested" is clearly
to imply that it is "vested" to begin with. To the extent that "vested"
simply means "has" (i.e., a fixed, noncontingent right exercisable by an
identifiable person), it goes without saying that management and con-
trol rights are "vested." Prior to January 1, 1975, each spouse had
exclusive rights to management and control of certain items of commu-
nity property;28 5 after that date, neither spouse has such exclusive rights.
Each spouse has, however, non-exclusive rights to management and
control of all community property, subject to the co-equal rights of the
other spouse, or exercisable together with the other spouse.28 6 "Vested"
is, however, one of the most loosely-used and least-understood terms in
the legal lexicon.28 7 As most often used, a "vested rightf' connotes a
"protectible property right," the interference with which raises constitu-
tional issues.288
The legislature also stated that the right to management and control is
282. Law of Sept. 23, 1974, ch. 1206, § 7, [1974] Cal. Stat. 2609 provides: "This act
shall not apply to or affect any act or transaction which occurred prior to January 1,
1975."
283. See Law of Sept. 23, 1974, ch. 1206, § 1, [1974] Cal. Stat. 2609.
284. Id. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 5105 (West Supp. 1975).
285. See Former § 5124, supra note 13; Former §§ 5125, 5127, supra note 12.
286. CAL. Civ. CoDn §§ 5125, 5127 (West Supp. 1975).
287. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Loehr, 114 Cal. Rptr. 536, 539 (Cal. App. 1974),
vacated, 13 Cal. 3d 465, 531 P.2d 425, 119 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1975).
288. Our inherent distaste for retroactive application of legislative enactments
would, perhaps, be obviated if, at least in the area under discussion, the courts
would refrain from relying upon the 'vested rights' verbalization. In the case of
the husband's management and control, for example, is it not more accurate to state
that the husband does not have a 'vested right' to dispose of the community prop-
erty as he sees fit, but rather [that] he has the responsibility, the duty, if you will,
to manage it for the common good?
Knutson, supra note 46, at 272.
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"not a fundamental right."289 Since "property rights" are considered
"fundamental rights" under our system, this language implies that man-
agement and control rights are not "property rights." The implication
is reinforced when, in the same sentence, it is stated that the right to
manage and control community property "is not accorded the same
status as the rights of the spouses in community property. . . which
are, and remain, present, existing, and equal. .. .
The "present, existing, and equal" formulation is taken from section
5105 of the Civil Code.291 That section, first enacted in 1927292 as
section 161a, also provides that it "shall be construed as defining the
respective interests and rights of husband and wife in the community
property. '293  Since section 5105 accords to each spouse a "vested
property right" in the community property29  (at least as to such
property acquired after 1927),295 and the legislature has stated that
management and control rights are "not accorded the same status"1290 as
the rights of the spouses under section 5105, the best reading of the
preamble to the 1974 "retroactivity legislation" would seem to be that
the legislature does not consider management and control rights to be
"property rights. 297  An examination of the development of California
law on this subject will demonstrate that the legislature is correct in its
assessment.
In Spreckels, the California Supreme Court stated that " . . . the
husband is the absolute owner of the community property."2 8 In
reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Panaud v. Jones2 9 and a
Louisiana case, Guice v. Lawrence.800 Both Panaud and Guice are said
289. Law of Sept. 23, 1974, ch. 1206, § 1, [1974] Cal. Stat. 2609.
290. Id.
291. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5105 (West Supp. 1975).
292. Law of April 28, 1927, ch. 265, § 1, [1927] Cal. Stat. 484.
293. CAL. Crv. CODE § 5105 (West Supp. 1975).
294. In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427;
Siberell v. Siberell, 214 Cal. 767, 7 P.2d 1003 (1932); Horton v. Horton, 115
Cal. App. 2d 360, 252 P.2d 397 (1953); Bonanno, supra note 10, at 111; DnFUoMA &
VAuGNm, supra note 2, at 266-67; see Armstrong, supra note 24, at 482.
295. DEFuNrK & VAUGHm, supra note 2, at 266-67; see Bonanno, supra note 10, at
112; Armstrong, supra note 24, at 482.
296. Law of Sept. 23, 1974, ch. 1206, § 1, [1974] Cal. Stat. 2609.
297. Professor Bonanno seems to argue that the right to management and control is a
"property right." See Bonanno, supra note 10, at 99, 100, 102-03; cf. id. at 104;
Armstrong, supra note 24, at 482-83. But see Bonanno, supra note 10, at 111-12.
298. Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 343, 48 P. 228, 229 (1897).
299. 1 Cal. 488 (1851).
300. 2 La. Ann. 226 (1847).
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to have been based on a "mistranslation and misinterpretation ''301 of
Spanish law. According to DeFuniak and Vaughn, Spanish law recog-
nized the husband and wife as equal and present owners of the commu-
nity property, 02 even though the husband was charged with its adminis-
tration during the marriage.
303
By 1926, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in Phillips v. Phillips,304
had recognized the "error"3 0' 5 of Guice, and stated that it had been, in
effect, overruled. 00 Furthermore the court stated that language to the
effect that the wife's interest was only an expectancy constituted "loose
expressions. 30 7  According to the Louisana court, "[tihe wife's half
interest in the community property is not a mere expectancy during the
marriage. . . .The title for half of the community property is vested in
the wife the moment it is acquired .. ."08
California Civil Code section 682, enacted in 1872, provides that:
The ownership of property by several persons is either:
1. Of joint interests;
2. Of partnership interests;
3. Of interests in common;
4. Of community interest of husband and wife.309
301. DEFuNMK & VAUGHN, supra note 2, at 264. See id. at 263-67. See also Reppy,
supra note 10, at 1055-59. Although Panaud did not cite Guice, it apparently relied
on the same "erroneous translation." See DEFuNiAX & VAUGHN, supra note 2,
at 264-65, where it is also stated that Panaud relied -upon Guice. The fact remains
that Spreckels relied upon both Panaud and Guice, and that a leading early California
case, Van Maren v. Johnsen, 15 Cal. 308, 3-11 (1860), also relied upon Guice. To the
effect that Van Maren was incorrect in its characterization of the wife's interest as an
"expectancy," see G. McKAY, CommuNrT'PRoPFRy 785-86 (2d ed. 1925).
302. DEFurAMK & VAUGHN, supra note 2, at 241-45.
303. Id. at 250-56.
304. 107 So. 584 (La. 1926).
305. Id. at 588.
306. Id. at 589.
307. Id. at 588.
308. Id. In Creech v. Capital Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973), the Louisiana
Supreme Court discussed at length the question of the interests of husband and wife with
respect to community property. Creech involved -the availability of community property
to satisfy antenuptial debts of -the husband. Holding that community property is liable
for such debts, but that "the husband must account for the enrichment of his separate
estate by the discharge of antenuptial debts upon dissolution of the community" (id. at
510), the court stated that Phillips "is overruled or modified to the extent it conflicts
with this opinion." Id. However, insofar as Phillips held that the wife had an
"ownership interest" in the community property during the marriage, that holding is
reaffirmed (although refined) by Creech. Id. at 508-10.
309. CAL. Civ. CODE § 682 (West 1970).
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Section 5104, originally enacted as section 161 in 1872, provides that:
"A husband and wife may hold property as joint tenants, tenants in
common, or as community property." 10 These sections seem clearly to
recognize that the California wife had a true "ownership interest" in the
community property. This view is bolstered by the fact that in 1871
legislation was proposed which, in cases of "fraudulent transfers, gross
mismanagement or profligate waste" of community property by the
husband, would have given the wife an action to: (1) obtain sole
management and control of the community property; or (2) have a
trustee appointed to manage it; or (3) obtain a partition of the commu-
nity property, with the part awarded to each spouse becoming his or her
separate property.311 Even though this section was not included in the
Civil Code of 1872, the fact that it was even considered, together with
the presence in that code of sections 682 and 161, indicates that the
legislature, at least, did not consider the wife's interest a "mere expect-
ancy."
The insistence of the California courts that the husband was the
"owner" of the community property doubtless resulted, at least in part,
from their failure to comprehend community property law as a civilian
institution.812  Applying common-law property concepts, the courts
failed to distinguish between "ownership" and "control"113 -- even
though it seems odd that minds trained in the law of trusts (itself an
institution of the common law) could fail to perceive that one person
could have a presently protectible interest in specific property while
another person was charged with its administration.
The reasoning which led to adoption of the Doctrine of Prospective
Application, as applied to management and control amendments, ap-
pears circular: The husband is the sole owner of the community proper-
ty because he has sole powers of management and control; since he is
the sole owner, his powers of management and control cannot be
lessened to any degree, because those powers are among the most
important attributes of ownership. This "confusion between the practi-
cal effect of the husband's power and its legal ground"81 4 in effect led to
the conclusion that "because of a provision which simply pointed out
310. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5104 (West 1970).
311. CAL,. Crv. CODE § 178 (Gelwicks 1871), quoted in Grant, supra note 1, at 253-
54.
312. DEFuNiAx & VAUWG, supra note 2, at 258-59, 266.
313. Id.
314. Arnett v. Reade, 220 U.S. 311, 320 (1911).
540 [Vol, 9
1976] COMMUNITY PROPERTY
how common property should be administered, . there was no
common property to be administered," 315 or, in the words of Mr. Justice
Holmes, that "community is a partnership which begins only at its
end. 310
Consideration of the "retroactivity" feature of the 1975 management
and control amendments will offer the present California Supreme
Court the opportunity to overrule Spreckels317 and other cases318 insofar
as they held the husband to have been the "owner" of the community
property.31 9  In addition the court will have the opportunity to declare
that management and control rights are not "vested property rights,"
and may be diminished or altered by subsequent legislation.
The supreme court, however, need not go quite so far in order effec-
tively to hold the 1975 management and control amendments applicable
to all community property whenever acquired. Since 1927, at least as
to post-1927 acquisitions, each spouse has had an equal, 'vested prop-
erty interest" in the community property.320  The court could simply hold
that, as to post-1927 community property, the spouse designated as
"manager" has held a "bare power in trust for the community,"32' but
no greater property rights than the other spouse.3 22 Thus the legislature
would be perfectly competent to withdraw sole management and control
315. Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484, 497 (1900).
316. Arnett v. Reade, 220 U.S. 311, 319 (1911).
317. Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228 (1897).
318. E.g., Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308 (1860); Panaud v. Jones, 1 Cal. 488
(1851).
319. Such a decision should have no unsettling effect on land titles, or on transac-
tions completed in the distant past. Whether or not -the husband was the sole "owner,"
he had certain statutory rights to control and disposition of community property at
certain times. For example, prior to 1917 (and even after 1917, under the ruling in
Roberts v. Wehmeyer, 191 Cal. 601, 218 P. 22 (1923), as to property acquired prior
thereto) he could convey or encumber community realty without the wife's joinder,
whereas after 1917 her joinder was required. No doubt need be cast on transactions
completed under those rules. However, possibly complex tracing issues would be
eliminated in futuro; for example, the present law would apply to all future conveyances
of community realty, regardless of whether its source was traceable to pre-1917 assets.
320. CAr.. Crv. CODE § 5105 (West Supp. 1975); see authorities cited in note 294
supra.
321. Bonanno, supra note 10, at 111.
322. To the author's knowledge, no one has ever seriously argued that the enactment
of section 171c (later section 5124) in 1951, giving the wife management and control
over, for example, her earnings, made her the "sole owner" of her earnings, or conferred
upon her any greater "property rights" in them than those of her husband. In fact, that
section specifically provided that it was not to be construed as "changing the respective
interests of the husband and wife in such community property, as defined in Section
5105." Former § 5124, supra note 13.
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power from one spouse and confer it upon both, since the respective
property interests of the spouses would be the same regardless of who
had management and control 2' As was stated in Holyoke v.
Jackson:
3 24
Management and disposition may be vested in either one or both of the
spouses. If in one, then that one is not thereby made the holder of
larger proprietary rights than the other, but is clothed, in addition to his
or her proprietary rights, with a bare power in trust for the communi-
"ty.8
2 5
The result of such a holding would leave intact the Spreckels rule
that, as to pre-1927 community property, the wife had a "mere expect-
ancy" and the husband's powers of management and control, as defined
by the law in effect at the time of the acquisition, could not be affected
by subsequent legislation. The practical effect of the holding, however,
would be to make the 1975 management and control legislation applica-
ble to all community property, since the Spreckels rule could apply only
to Californians who were married prior to 1927.820 In the few cases to
which the Spreckels rule could apply, the proponent of the application
of that rule (presumably the husband) would bear the burden of tracing
the acquisition of the property in question or the corpus from which it
derived to the pre-1927 period.827 That burden should prove practical-
ly impossible in most cases.82
323. Bonanno, supra note 10, at 111; see Arnett v. Reade, 220 U.S. 311 (1911);
Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484 (1900).
324. 3 P. 841 (Wash. 1882).
325. Id. at 842.
326. Indeed, the last major pre-1927 management and control change to which the
DPA was applied occurred in 1923 (involving amendments to what is now section 201 of
the Probate Code). See notes 46-50 supra and accompanying text. See also note 54
supra. Other major changes took place in 1917 and 1891.
327. Armstrong, supra note 24, at 477; see notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
A rebuttable presumption, by analogy to the "commingling cases," should apply, so that
the 1975 law would be presumed applicable to all community property. The husband
would then bear the burden of tracing to identify the pre-1927 property to which the
Spreckels rule would apply. To the extent that there had been significant commingling
of pre-1927 and post-1927 community property, so that precise tracing was impossible,
the 1975 law would apply to the entire mass. See Bonanno, supra note 10, at 103;
Reppy, supra note 10, at 1103-07; In re Marriage of Mix, 14 Cal. 3d 604, 536 P.2d 479,
122 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1975); See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888
(1966).
328. See note 327 supra and authorities cited therein. Moreover, a presumption
should apply that the source of any post-1927 acquisition was post-1927 community
property. See Bone v. Dwyer, 74 Cal. App. 363, 240 P. 796 (1925); Reppy, supra note
10, at 1105-06.
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V. CONCLUSION
Since 1891, the California legislature has acted on several occasions
to increase the rights and protections afforded the wife with respect to
community property. Since 1927, the interests of the spouses in com-
munity property have been "equal," although, for most of that time,
most community property has been under the management and control
of the husband. At every step, the California courts have blocked full
and immediate implementation of these legislative enactments through
the unnecessary application of questionable constitutional doctrine. The
legislature has "cooperated" in each case through its failure clearly to
indicate its intent that the changes operate "retroactively." With the
1975 "equal rights" amendments, the legislature, in announcing its
intent that they apply to all community property, whenever acquired,
has offered the supreme court a clear chance to repudiate the tattered
Doctrine of Prospective Application as it has applied to management
and control amendments. That the court will do so seems clear from its
decision in In re Marriage of Bouquet.29 Rather than mechanistically
apply Bouquet, which "over-interpreted" Addison v. Addison, °30 the
court should seize the opportunity to reexamine the Spreckels doctrine
and forever lay to rest old ghosts.
329. 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976).
330. 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965).
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